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Abstract
Amidst the regular drumbeat of reports about Russian
attempts to undermine U.S. democratic institutions from Twitter
bots to cyber-attacks on Congressional candidates, it is easy to
forget that the problem of election security is not isolated to the
United States and extends far beyond safeguarding insecure
voting machines. Consider Australia, which has long been
grappling with repeated Chinese attempts to interfere with its
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political system. Yet Australia has taken a distinct approach in
how it has sought to protect its democratic institutions, including
reclassifying its political parties as “critical infrastructure,” a
step that the U.S. government has yet to take despite repeated
breaches at both the Democratic and Republican National
Committees.
This Article analyzes the Australian approach to protecting
its democratic institutions from Chinese influence operations
and compares it to the U.S. response to Russian efforts. It then
moves on to discuss how other cyber powers, including the
European Union, have taken on the fight against digital
repression and disinformation, and then compares these
practices to the particular vulnerabilities of Small Pacific Island
Nations. Such a comparative study is vital to help build
resilience, and trust, in democratic systems on both sides of the
Pacific. We argue that a multifaceted approach is needed to build
more resilient and sustainable democratic systems. This should
encompass both targeted reforms focusing on election
infrastructure security—such as requiring paper ballots and
risk-limiting audits—with deeper structural interventions to
limit the spread of misinformation and combat digital
repression.
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I.

Introduction

Democracy has never been and never can be so durable as
Aristocracy or Monarchy. But while it lasts it is more bloody
than either . . . Remember, democracy never lasts long. It
soon wastes exhausts and murders itself. There never was a
Democracy Yet, that did not commit suicide.

U.S. President John Adams1
Since the U.S. was founded, detractors and critics have
heralded its ultimate downfall.2 Benjamin Franklin once
famously quipped after being asked what sort of government the
Founders had gifted the new nation: “A republic, if you can keep
it.”3 For the more than 230 years since that time, many of the
threats to American democracy, as with other emerging and
advanced democracies around the world, have stemmed from
1. Letter from John Adams to John Taylor (Dec. 17, 1814),
http://perma.cc/724R-ESVB.
2. See, e.g., Richard R. Beeman, Perspectives on the Constitution: A
Republic, If You Can Keep It, NAT’L. CONST. CTR., https://perma.cc/J36F-2EAP
(presenting the initial, objectionable reactions of the Founding Fathers when
they were presented with the United States Constitution).
3. Id.
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internal divisions fed by inequality, injustice, and racism;
fissures that have from time to time purposefully been widened
and deepened by foreign nations wishing to distract and
destabilize the U.S. government.4
Recently, Russia has been particularly active, by one
estimate interfering in twenty-seven elections since 1991,
beginning with the nations of Eastern Europe that had been
former members of the Cold War-era Warsaw Pact.5 Such efforts
have been extended since 2014 to Western Europe and the
United States, reaching a culmination in their interference with
the 2016 Brexit vote and U.S. Presidential election, made easier
by the rise of internet platforms generally and social networking
in particular.6 Such efforts continued into the 2018 U.S.
midterm elections, when U.S. Cyber Command shut down a
Russian troll farm on Election Day.7
Furthermore, today’s threats to democratic institutions in
the United States and abroad are acute, extending from the
protection of voting machines and media sites to related issues
of critical infrastructure, 5G, and even Internet of Things (IoT)
vulnerabilities.8 Keeping the Republic for the next century,
then, requires a range of policy responses from reigning in the
worst excesses of internet platforms to securing the voting
process itself to safeguarding democratic institutions from being
4. See, e.g., Josh Zeitz, Foreign Governments Have Been Tampering with
U.S. Elections for Decades, POLITICO (July 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/CAQ8UW5A (noting multiple occasions of foreign interference with American
presidential elections).
5. See Luncan Ahmad Way & Adam Casey, Russia Has Been Meddling
in Foreign Elections for Decades. Has it Made a Difference?, WASH. POST (Jan.
8, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/2BC8-J9MK (examining the two waves of
Russian interference with United States presidential elections since the early
1990s).
6. See id. (noting that since 2014, Russia has used the internet to spread
disinformation campaigns, create fake Facebook profiles, leak emails and fake
documents to WikiLeaks, and engage in cyberattacks and phishing attacks).
7. See Jacqueline Thomsen, US Cyber Operation Blocked Internet for
Russian Troll Farm on Election Day 2018: Report, HILL (Feb. 26, 2019, 12:32
PM), https://perma.cc/MB9T-SWX6 (discussing the ability of the United States
Cyber Command to block Russian interference in the 2018 midterm elections).
8. See Scott J. Shackelford et al., Making Democracy Harder to Hack, 50
MICH. J.L. REFORM 629, 630–33 (2017) (highlighting cybersecurity
vulnerabilities in the United States’ national and state electoral systems).
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undermined by both foreign and domestic efforts, offline and
online.9 Luckily, much as U.S. states are often seen as
laboratories for democracy, this debate does not exist in a
vacuum.10 U.S. policymakers can and should learn from what
has worked elsewhere in our common quest to make democracy
“harder to hack.”11
Indeed, amidst the regular drumbeat of reports about
Russian attempts to undermine U.S. democratic institutions
from Twitter bots to cyber-attacks on congressional candidates,
it is easy to forget that the problem of election security is not
isolated to the United States and extends far beyond
safeguarding insecure voting machines.12 Consider Australia,
which has long been grappling with repeated Chinese attempts
to interfere with its political system. One 2018 report found that
the Chinese have infiltrated “every layer of Australian
Government, right down to local councils.”13 Yet Australia has
taken a distinct approach in how it has sought to protect its
democratic institutions, including reclassifying its political
parties as “critical infrastructure,” a step that the U.S.
government has yet to take despite repeated breaches at both
the Democratic and Republican National Committees. 14
This Article details the Australian approach to protecting
its democratic institutions from Chinese influence operations
and compares it to the U.S. response to Russian meddling
efforts. Such a comparative study is vital to help build
resilience, and trust, in democratic systems on both sides of the
9. See id. (evaluating the policy debate surrounding the designation of
the United States electoral system as a critical infrastructure).
10. See id. (detailing instances of election tampering, both internationally
and in the United States).
11. See generally id.
12. See Michael Wines & Julian E. Barnes, How the U.S. Is Fighting
Russian
Election
Interference,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
2,
2018),
https://perma.cc/B7LH-D57T (stating that the most pervasive Russian threats
are those concerning social media).
13. Stephanie Borys, China’s ‘Brazen’ and ‘Aggressive’ Political
Interference Outlined in Top-Secret Report, ABC NEWS (May 29, 2018, 5:28
PM), https://perma.cc/D27J-JGDQ.
14. See 2016 Presidential Campaign Hacking Fast Facts, CNN (Oct. 31,
2019, 1:10 PM), https://perma.cc/VUR3-ZJAD (offering a timeline for the
investigations and conclusions about the 2016 election hacking efforts).
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Pacific. But we do not stop there. For the first time in the
literature that we could identify, we also analyze the efforts of
other leading cyber powers—including the European
Union—comparing them against not only the United States and
Australia, but also Small Pacific Island Nations, to better
understand how to deter misinformation and disinformation
campaigns in 2020 and beyond.15
In all, we argue that democracies can and should work
together to share both cyber threat information and best
practices to build resilience in democratic institutions the world
over, and that a multi-faceted approach is needed that combines
both targeted reforms to secure election infrastructure—such as
requiring paper ballots and risk-limiting audits—with deeper
structural interventions to limit the spread of misinformation
and combat “digital repression.”16 We assert that it is vital to
take this wider view of defending democracy that includes not
only a focus on protecting election infrastructure, but also
digital repression—both are means to an end, undermining
trust, and confidence, in democratic institutions. As such,
defending democracy in 2020 and beyond requires
implementing policy responses that tackle this full range of
cyber-enabled threats, which are not limited to insecure voting
machines and processes.17
The Article is structured as follows. Part II offers a short
history of the cyber threat facing democracies, focusing on the
15. See Australia Increases Investment in South Pacific Islands in an
Apparent Response to China’s Growing Economic Influence in the Region,
RWR ADVISORY GRP. (July 13, 2018, 11:52 AM), https://perma.cc/AR8W-5Q7G
(recounting the Australian government’s MoU with the Solomon Islands and
Papua New Guinea to address China’s growing economic activity in the areas).
16. See Brandon Valeriano, Welcome to the Age of Digital Repression,
QUARTZ (Jan. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/W9A9-HRTN (deeming cyber
repression as one of the digital age’s most important challenges and revealing
that Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton previously called for shutting down
the internet).
17. Further, it is important to note that prevalent cyber insecurity can
feed digital repression; indeed, oftentimes new regulations from autocratic
nations that are designed to address cybersecurity issues often wind up
further entrenching repression. See Adrian Shahbaz, Fake News, Data
Collection, and the Challenge to Democracy, FREEDOM HOUSE,
https://perma.cc/Z3UB-386H (referencing the growing censorship of the
internet leading to the disruption of democracies).
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role of authoritarian regimes in furthering digital repression.
Part III summarizes U.S. efforts to protect election
infrastructure post-2016. Part IV features a comparative case
study summarizing EU efforts to similarly safeguard their
democratic societies as compared to efforts from Australia and
Oceania. Finally, Part V crystallizes implications and suggests
policy responses to better manage both threats to election
infrastructure and digital repression.
II.

Unpacking the Cyber Threat to Democracies

Threats to democracy, both foreign and domestic, take a
variety of forms, which is part of the challenge in coming up with
coherent policy responses.18 For example, depending on the
scale and preferred lens, it is possible to view post-2016 efforts
to secure democracies as an exercise in regulating social media
firms to guard against both misinformation and
disinformation,19 protecting vulnerable critical infrastructure,20
or even as one facet of a larger needed debate on governing the
Internet of Things,21 to name a few. This Part helps to frame out
this broader discussion by providing a short history of
cyber-enabled election interference and how authoritarian

18. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 26–28 (2017), https://perma.cc/SGG4-9TLH (PDF)
(explaining that, due to the patient and strategic combination of political,
economic, military, and informational strategies employed against the United
States, responding to threats such as those related to cyber security, are more
challenging).
19. Disinformation is commonly understood as false information that is
spread deliberately with the goal of deceiving a targeted population, while
misinformation may or may not be intentional, but is inaccurate. See
Propaganda vs. Misinformation, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. SHERIDAN LIBRS.,
https://perma.cc/E2QW-G74W (last updated June 20, 2020, 4:28 PM)
(comparing propaganda, information, misinformation, and disinformation).
20. See Scott J. Shackelford, Opinion, How to Make Democracy Harder to
Hack, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/S6M6-EDFU
(listing the items that are considered critical infrastructure).
21. See Scott J. Shackelford, When Toasters Attack: Enhancing the
‘Security of Things’ Through Polycentric Governance, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 415,
418 (considering the protection measures needed for cybersecurity resulting
from the Internet of Things).
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regimes use digital repression both at home and abroad to help
shape political debates.
A.

Understanding Election Insecurity

In general, election security is discussed in two
interconnected yet separate areas of research.22 The first
involves election infrastructure security and is focused on the
security of the system itself, such as voting machines and
tabulation systems.23 The second is the fight against digital
repression, including misinformation disseminated by social
media.24 Both areas are essential to the overall goal of defending
democracy, and one cannot be successful without the other.25
Hacking into voting machines remains far too easy.26 The
vulnerabilities are not just theoretical.27 They have been
exploited around the world, such as in South Africa, Ukraine,
Bulgaria and the Philippines. 28 In 2014, for example,
22. See THE NAT’L. ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G., & MED., SECURING THE VOTE:
PROTECTING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, xi–xiii (2018) (ebook) [hereinafter
SECURING THE VOTE] (explaining that while the authors thought that their
attentions would be devoted to the threats posed by long polling lines and
outdated election systems, they also had to focus on the threats emerging from
social media and other digital media).
23. See LAWRENCE NORDEN & CHRISTOPHER FAMIGHETTI, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR
JUST., AMERICA’S VOTING MACHINES AT RISK 8–15 (2015),
https://perma.cc/5ZP7-JDV2 (PDF) (discussing the need to replace and
upgrade aging voting systems and address insecure tabulation systems to
protect election security).
24. See Shahbaz, supra note 17 (discussing the connection between
digital censorship and repression).
25. See SECURING THE VOTE, supra note 22, at 4 (articulating the threats
of both election infrastructure and digital media on election security).
26. See Shackelford, supra note 20 (detailing the ability of researchers
from the University of Michigan to hack into government webpages in 2012 to
have the University’s fight song play after votes were casted).
27. See id. (providing concrete examples of hacking incidents on voting
machines and databases in South Africa and the United States).
28. See John Leyden, Hacker Almost Derailed Mandela Election in South
Africa, REGISTER (Oct. 27, 2010), https://perma.cc/LW3L-MJKX (detailing the
ability of an unidentified hacker to almost successfully derail the democratic
elections in South Africa); Daniel Funke & Daniela Flamini, A Guide to
Anti-Misinformation Actions Around the World, POYNTER (Sept. 8, 2020),

Stemler.PostBlueline.docx (Do Not Delete)

DEFENDING DEMOCRACY

1/15/2021 5:03 PM

1755

Russian-backed hackers targeted Ukraine by attempting to fake
vote totals for its presidential election.29 They were caught just
in time, but the sophistication of the attacks should have been
seen as “a warning shot for future elections in the US and
abroad.”30 Unfortunately, the U.S. government did not take the
warning as seriously as it should have, as is discussed in Part
III. But it should be noted that successful attacks do not need
the resources and expertise of national governments—even kids
have managed to orchestrate them.31
Election security suffers from common threats, as are
summarized in Table 1, that range from outdated voting
machines to insecure tabulation systems, each of which requires
a different policy response as is discussed in Part V. This
non-comprehensive list underscores the extent to which cyber
insecurity enables digital repression, and vice versa, such as
when hackers target vulnerabilities in government IT systems
to spread misinformation about an upcoming election
purportedly through official channels.32

https://perma.cc/2MPG-DWP9 (last updated Aug. 13, 2020) (referencing
reports conducted by the EU to address the growing concern about
misinformation and summarizing the responses of different countries to the
spread of online misinformation).
29. See Mark Clayton, Ukraine Election Narrowly Avoided ‘Wanton
Destruction’ from Hackers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 17, 2014),
https://perma.cc/23H9-AGZ6 (discussing the three-pronged cyber-attack on
Ukraine’s presidential election).
30. Id.
31. See Alex Hern, Kids at Hacking Conference Show How Easily US
Elections
Could
be
Sabotaged,
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
22,
2018),
https://perma.cc/TBM2-VD87 (highlighting a child’s ability to hack into
websites, including those used for voter registration and campaigning efforts
and the significant potential that creates for undermining election security).
32. See, e.g., Seven Ways Misinformation Spread During the 2016
Election, KNIGHT FOUND. (Oct. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/ZBR5-633R
(providing a list of the many ways that misinformation was conveyed during
the 2016 election).
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Table 1: Non-Comprehensive List of Election
Security Threats33
Phase(s)

Setup

Setup

Campaign

All phases

Assets

Party/
candidate
registration

Electoral
rolls

Examples of Threats
•

Tampering with
registrations

•

Denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks or overload of
party/campaign
registration causing them
to miss the deadline

•

Fabricated signatures
from sponsor

•

Identity fraud during
voter registration

•

Deleting or tampering
with voter data

•

DoS or overload of voter
registration system
suppressing voters

•

Hacking candidate
laptops or email accounts

•

Hacking campaign
websites (defacement,
DoS)

•

Misconfiguration of a
website

•

Leak of confidential
information

•

Hacking/misconfiguration
of government servers

Campaign IT

Government
IT

33. NIS COOP. GRP., COMPENDIUM ON CYBER SECURITY OF ELECTION
TECHNOLOGY 16 (2018), [hereinafter COMPENDIUM] https://perma.cc/BMG4C8WS (PDF).
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Voting

Election
technology

•

Communication networks,
or endpoints

•

Hacking government
websites, spreading
misinformation on the
election process,
registered
parties/candidates, or
results

•

DoS or overload of
government websites

•

Tampering or DoS of
voting and/or vote
confidentiality during or
after the elections

•

Software bug altering
election results

•

Tampering with
logs/journals

•

Breach of voter privacy
during the casting of
votes

•

Tampering, DoS, or
overload of the systems
used for counting or
aggregating results

•

Tampering or DoS of
communication links used
to transfer (interim)
results

•

Tampering with supply
chain involved in the
movement or transfer of
data
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Campaign,
public
communication

•

Hacking of internal
systems used by media or
press

•

Tampering, DoS, or
overload of media
communication links

•

Defacement, DoS, or
overload of websites or
other systems used for
publication of the results

Media/ press

Table 1 serves as a framework for exploring the complex
issue of democracy insecurity; however, no single issue should
be focused on in isolation as each forms a complex backbone of
the overall needs of the democratic system.34 This Article
focuses specifically upon the dual, related issues of securing
election infrastructure and digital repression.35 Yet, as is clear,
these threats only constitute a small fraction of the larger
conversation about maintaining the integrity of democratic
systems.36 As such, this Article attempts to break down these
areas into discrete conversations, without losing sight of the
larger context in which the system is placed.
B.

A Brief History of Cyber-Enabled Election Interference

Foreign electoral interference is nothing new. 37 One study
found that from 1945 to 2000, the United States and Russia
combined tried to influence foreign elections 117 times, using

34. See SECURING THE VOTE, supra note 22, at 4 (discussing the impacts
of election infrastructure and digital media).
35. See id. (exploring the relationship between election infrastructure
and digital repression).
36. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 33, at 16 (providing a list of election
security threats).
37. See Don H. Levin, When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of
Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results, 60 INT’L. STUD. Q. 189,
189 (2016) (discussing electoral interventions).
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both overt and covert methods.38 It is not even a novelty to use
cyber-attacks to influence the outcome of an election. As far back
as 1994, Nelson Mandela’s presidential victory in South Africa
was initially diluted due to an illicit computer program.39
Russia, in particular, has been developing its disinformation
capabilities for decades, long before the first packet of
information was sent on a fiber optic cable.40 Pre-Soviet Union,
the Tsarist secret police (the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy
Bezopasnosti (KGB), now Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti
(FSB), which is the predecessor Federal Security Service) used
disinformation.41 Joseph Stalin created an independent agency
for dezinformatsiya designed to undermine political opponents
and mislead Soviet citizens and foreigners alike as to the
USSR’s intentions.42 During the Cold War, for example, Russian
agents helped plant “hundreds of bogus headlines around the
world” such as the claim that the U.S. government created the
autoimmune disease AIDS, a false claim that was first
mentioned in an Indian newspaper in the 1980s after being
planted by a KGB agent.43 That story eventually circled the
world, and was even mentioned by a famous American
newsperson, Dan Rather, on the CBS Evening News in 1987.44
Effective disinformation campaigns typically have three
components: (1) a state-sponsored news outlet to originate the
fabrication; (2) alternative media sources willing to spread it
without adequately checking the underlying facts; and (3)
witting or unwitting “agents of influence” (e.g., accomplices or
38.
39.

Id.
See Aislinn Laing, Election Won by Mandela ‘Rigged by Opposition,’
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 24, 2010, 6:47 PM), https://perma.cc/C63L-VW5K (stating
that a hacker rigged the election). Unfortunately, the hacker who installed
this program was never identified. Id. For more on this topic, see Shackelford
et al., supra note 8, at 629.
40. See Ben Popken, Factory of Lies: Russia’s Disinformation Playbook
Exposed, NBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2018, 8:02 PM), https://perma.cc/H974-GPDY
(noting Russia’s early efforts to spread disinformation during the Cold War
through inaccurate newspaper headlines).
41. See id. (dating Russia’s use of disinformation back to the 1880s when
it was utilized by the Tsarist secret police).
42. See id.
43. See id (describing the worldwide spread).
44. Id.
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unknowing agents) to advance the story in other outlets. 45 The
advent of cyberspace has put the disinformation process into
overdrive, both speeding the viral spread of stories across
national boundaries and platforms with ease, and causing a
proliferation in the types of traditional and social media willing
to run with fake stories.46 One tragic example is a false story
about adopted children being butchered for their organs and
sold to wealthy U.S. citizens that first appeared in Honduras in
1986, which was quickly debunked with the official whom was
quoted denying the episode and issuing a correction, but that
did not stop Soviet newspapers from spreading it around the
world.47 But this is just one tool among many.48 Nations such as
China and Russia also inundate internet discussion forums with
so-called “flooding attacks” that enable distraction and
disinformation.49 As Henry Farrell and Bruce Schneier write:
“Libertarians often argue that the best antidote to bad speech is
more speech. What Vladimir Putin discovered was that the best
antidote to more speech was bad speech.” 50
Such actions are not confined to the physical or digital
borders of illiberal regimes.51 Russia has been linked with
“confidence attacks” aimed at destabilizing democracies
(especially those in bordering countries, such as Ukraine) and

45. See id. (detailing a successful disinformation campaign).
46. See, e.g., Davey Alba & Adam Satariano, At Least 70 Countries Have
Had Disinformation Campaigns, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://perma.cc/TGZ4-93FS (demonstrating that at least seventy countries
have suffered from political disinformation campaigns despite overwhelming
efforts by programs designed to stop them).
47. See Popken, supra note 40 (explaining the promulgation of false
headlines by Russian and Soviet agents during the Cold War).
48. See Henry Farrell & Bruce Schneier, The Most Damaging Election
Disinformation Campaign Came from Donald Trump, Not Russia, VICE (Nov.
19, 2018, 10:26 AM), https://perma.cc/5GYL-KE4S (articulating the many
methods of undermining election security, including the spread of false
information, flooding attacks, confidence attacks, and Donald Trump’s own
comments about fraudulent election results).
49. See id. (discussing flooding attacks and their effect on democracy).
50. Id.
51. See id. (stating that the United States felt like the internet could
positively spread liberal, American values).
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undermining trust in elections,52 a practice that, as we have
seen, dates back centuries but now makes use of modern
technologies along with the implicit trust and openness in
democratic societies. Russia, of course, is not alone in such
efforts.53 As will be discussed further, China is increasingly
emulating Russian disinformation efforts, particularly in
Taiwan and Australia, as is Iran, North Korea, and an array of
non-state actors including criminal organizations, terrorist
groups, and hacktivists.54 These groups are employing a range
of tactics to undermine trust in electoral processes ranging from
directly or indirectly intimidating voters to compromising
candidates by releasing damaging (and potentially fabricated)
information.55
It is impossible to say with certainty what the long-term
impacts have been of Russian, Chinese, and other
state-sponsored efforts to undermine trust in democratic
elections.56 John Sides, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck, for
example, did not find a lasting measurable impact of Russia’s
efforts in the United States following the 2016 election,57 while
Yochai Benker, Robert Farris, and Hal Roberts have argued
“that Fox News was far more influential in the spread of false

52. See id. (describing the “Russian social media trolls” that spread
rumors to create confusion during the 2016 election).
53. See Tim Mak, Former U.S. Diplomat Warns China Is Emulating
Russian Political Interference, NAT. PUB. RADIO (June 20, 2018, 4:19 PM),
https://perma.cc/W2N6-NMRC (discussing a former U.S. official’s warning
that nations, including China, Iran, and North Korea, are beginning to
interfere with elections).
54. See id. (discussing the National Security Council’s observation that
China, Iran, and North Korea are discovering that cyberspace is a good outlet
for their political agendas).
55. See, e.g., JAKUB JANDA, EUR. VALUES: KREMLIN WATCH REP., A
FRAMEWORK GUIDE TO TOOLS FOR COUNTERING HOSTILE FOREIGN ELECTORAL
INTERFERENCE, 13–15 (2017), https://perma.cc/B22B-7HB9 (PDF) (listing
thirty-five ways the integrity of an election can be compromised by foreign
actors).
56. See Farrell & Schneier, supra note 48 (citing JOHN SIDES ET AL.,
IDENTITY CRISIS: THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND THE BATTLE FOR THE
MEANING OF AMERICA (2018)).
57. Id. (citing JOHN SIDES ET AL., IDENTITY CRISIS: THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN AND THE BATTLE FOR THE MEANING OF AMERICA (2018)).
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news stories than any Russian effort.”58 Still, the fact that such
efforts are spreading and that, to date, the efforts of the U.S.
government, allied nations, and internet platforms have proven
insufficient to stem the flood raises questions about how best to
inoculate both advanced and emerging democracies against
these threats, some of which stem from authoritarian regimes
as is discussed next.
C.

Digital Repression

As Farrell and Schneier have argued, “[c]ybersecurity today
is not only about computer systems. It’s also about the ways
attackers can use computer systems to manipulate and
undermine public expectations about democracy.”59 This process
has only accelerated after the end of the Cold War, with the vast
majority of nations enjoying some degree of internet access and
more than thirty nations developing offensive cyber-attack
capabilities.60 Rather than being the final nail in the coffin of
authoritarianism, as was hoped by early cyber libertarians such
as John Perry Barlow’s maxim in his Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace, “Governments of the Industrial
World, you weary giants of flesh and steel . . . [,] [y]ou have no
sovereignty where we gather.”61 Instead, illiberal regimes from
Damascus to Beijing have coopted the internet to entrench their
power and control their populations. 62 The autocratic threat to
democracy is therefore not confined to election interference or

58. Id. (quoting YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA:
MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(2018)).
59. Id.
60. See id. (contrasting the Cold War era to today); Steve Ranger, US
Intelligence: 30 Countries Building Cyber Attack Capabilities, ZDNET (Jan. 5,
2017), https://perma.cc/QMP3-UYAR (claiming that more than thirty nations
have started to develop offensive cyber-attack strategies in response to
increased cybersecurity threats).
61. Christopher Shea, Sovereignty in Cyberspace, INT’L. ECON. L. & POL’Y
BLOG (Jan. 15, 2006), https://perma.cc/CZ5D-8HKG.
62. See EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF
INTERNET FREEDOM 100–03 (2011) (arguing that the internet presents many
avenues through which governments can censor information, including
outsourcing).
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misinformation campaigns.63 There are myriad other ways in
which illiberal regimes are using digital technologies to
undermine democratic values at home and abroad.64
Generally conceived, digital repression is the coercive use of
information and communication technologies by the state to
exert control over potential and existing challenges and
challengers.65 Digital repression includes a ranges of tactics
through which states are able to use digital technologies to
monitor and restrict the actions of their citizens, which include,
but are not limited to, digital surveillance, advanced biometric
monitoring, misinformation campaigns, and state-based
hacking.66 While digital repression does not specifically entail
the use of physical sanctions against an individual or
organization, it often carries with it the implicit assumption
that information gathered could be used for more violent
means.67 This often has the outcome of inflicting a chilling effect
on dissent against the state without sustained violence.68
Furthermore, as discussed above, these repressive activities can
be directed to individuals outside the state’s national borders,
in some cases compelling them to organize domestic dissident
groups or even compromise the election process itself.69
63. See id. at 13 (outlining political implications that an email in the
United States had on foreign relationships with Iran, China, and the Soviet
Union).
64. See id. at 99–101 (outlining ways that authoritarian governments can
censor internet information, including using hyperlinks and aggregation).
65. See Erica Frantz et. al., Digital Repression in Autocracies 1–5
(Varieties of Democracy Inst., Working Paper No. 27, 2020),
https://perma.cc/6U5D-G58F (PDF) (defining digital repression and
identifying the tools employed by governments engaging in it).
66. See Steven Feldstein, The Road to Digital Unfreedom: How Artificial
Intelligence Is Reshaping Repression, 30 J. DEMOCRACY 40, 41 (2019) (arguing
that AI technology and computer systems have provided autocracies with
substantially more political control over constituents).
67. See id. at 42 (“Because of this omnipresence, [AI systems] can induce
changes in behavior and create a significant ‘chilling effect’ even in the absence
of sustained physical violence.”).
68. See id. (asserting that AI systems motivate the public to conform and
avoid sending dissentious messages against the government).
69. See, e.g., Scott Shane, How Unwitting Americans Encountered
Russian Operatives Online, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/6L7C-
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States have always repressed.70 Even democracies,
particularly those democracies under threat,71 have used
surveillance and sometimes physical repression against their
own citizens.72 Repressive tactics include the violation of
physical integrity rights, such as harassment, detainment,
torture,73 and extrajudicial killings,74 as well as covert
repression through monitoring and surveilling which can
include wiretapping, organizational infiltration, and the use of
informants and agents provocateur.75 Repression in all forms is
KAKZ (recounting the Russian operators who created phony Heart of Texas
and Blacktivist groups and announced rallies to interfere with the 2016
election).
70. See Christian Davenport, State Repression and Political Order, 10
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 1, 1 (Margaret Levi et al. eds., 2007) (proposing that
repression is as old as “the founding of the nation-state”); see also ROBERT
JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA FROM 1870 TO
THE PRESENT 547 (1978) (“Political repression has been an important and
neglected factor in shaping major aspects of American political development
since 1870.”).
71. See Rudolph Rummel, Democracy, Power, Genocide, and Mass
Murder, 39 J. CONFLICT RES. 3, 3 (1995) (articulating that governments,
themselves, commit democide and repress their citizens).
72. See generally CHRISTIAN DAVENPORT, STATE REPRESSION AND THE
DOMESTIC DEMOCRATIC PEACE (2007) (discussing the repressive practices of the
then Hutu-led government); see also Courtenay Conrad et al., Torture and the
Limits of Democratic Institutions, 55 J. PEACE RSCH. 3, 4 (2018) (highlighting
the approval of executives in democratic nations that engage in torture and
repression).
73. See DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY 1–3 (2007) (arguing that
there are physical forms of torture but also silent torture tactics that generally
go unnoticed).
74. See Matthew Krain, State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and
Severity of Genocides and Politicides, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 331, 332 (1997)
(asserting that the internal and external characteristics of a state influence
the degree of genocide and politicide therein); see generally MANUS I.
MIDLARSKY, THE KILLING TRAP: GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2005)
(offering a comparative analysis of genocides, politicides, and ethnic
cleansings); BENJAMIN A. VALENTINO, FINAL SOLUTIONS: MASS KILLING AND
GENOCIDE IN THE 20TH CENTURY (Robert J. Art et al. eds., 2004) (discussing
mass killings).
75. See Christian Davenport, Understanding Covert Repressive Action:
The Case of the U.S. Government Against the Republic of New Africa, 49 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 120, 122 (2005) (describing the numerous covert techniques
that nations can use to learn about its constituents, the information spread
therein, and the social movements taking hold).
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costly for the state, and its citizens.76 Repression carries the
physical costs of maintaining a coercive apparatus and, in more
open regimes, it carries the potential audience costs of having
these actions exposed to the public.77 States choose to incur
these costs when they are under (real or perceived) threat,
which may be created or reinforced through disinformation.78
While the repressive power and potential of the state is not
a new phenomenon, digital technologies are offering a fresh
platform through which governments can exercise their powers
of control and self-preservation domestically.79 Rather than
offering the liberating potential originally associated with these
technologies,80 many are now arguing that “social media [is]
driving the spread of authoritarian practices.”81 Examples of
this phenomenon include the Arab Spring, as well as more
recent conflicts across the Middle East, and beyond.82
Digital technologies are changing the nature of state
repression in two primary ways. First, the speed and scope with
which information can be collected and processed is far greater
than any monitoring or surveillance techniques of the past.83 As
Ron Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski write, “[d]igital information
76. See Davenport, supra note 70, at 4 (exploring the costs associated
with repression and the cost-benefit analysis employed by repressive leaders).
77. See id. at 10 (noting that democratic nations have increased costs
associated with repressive action because officials are held accountable
through the electoral process).
78. See DAVENPORT, supra note 72, at 2 (discussing the Hutu- and
Tutsi-led governments’ repressive tactics).
79. See Ronald J. Deibert, Three Painful Truths About Social Media, 30
J. DEMOCRACY 25, 31 (2019) (arguing that social media enables
authoritarianism).
80. See Larry Diamond, Liberation Technology, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 69, 70
(2010) (examining social media as a tool for activists to organize against
authoritarianism).
81. Deibert, supra note 79, at 31.
82. See, e.g., Caroline Caywood, This Is How Social Media Is Being Used
in the Middle East, NAT’L INT. (Nov. 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/96LF-8258
(“Governments are using social media to rally domestic and foreign support
for their policies.”).
83. See Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, Liberation vs. Control: The
Future of Cyberspace, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 43, 43 (2010) (noting that no
technology other than digital technology has “grown with such speed and
spread so far geographically in such a short period of time”).
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can be easily tracked and traced, and then tied to specific
individuals who themselves can be mapped in space and time
with a degree of sophistication that would make the greatest
tyrants of days past envious.”84 This can be done on a much
wider swath of the population than was ever previously possible.
For example, states threatened by mass mobilization are able to
closely monitor, in real-time, crowd formations with the
potential to become mass rallies, allowing police to be put on
standby to immediately break up a protest before it grows.85
Second, the nature of repressive technologies has shifted
the capacity required for repression which in turn has shifted
the costs. As outlined above, repression is costly.86 It carries the
physical costs associated with maintaining a repressive
apparatus (e.g., training and paying soldiers and police,
maintaining detention facilities, etc.).87 In the past, mass
surveillance required an extensive network of informers.88 In
Poland in 1981, for example, at the height of the Sluzba
Bezpieczenstwa’s (Security Service) work to undermine the
Solidarity movement, there were an estimated 84,000
informers.89 New technologies produce the same level of
surveillance or greater from far fewer people.90 Such digital
84. Id. at 44.
85. See Feldstein, supra note 66, at 44 (noting that governments can use
AI to control protests).
86. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
87. See Feldstein, supra note 66, at 43 (“[Autocrats] relying on security
forces to repress their citizenry . . . entails . . . resource costs and political
risk.”).
88. See, e.g., Andreas Lichter et al., The Long-Term Costs of Government
Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany 2 (SOEPpapers,
Working Paper No. 865, 2016), https://perma.cc/3DDH-2BRX (PDF) (stating
that the number of informants relied on by East Germany’s Stasi secret police
“accounted for more than one percent of the East German population in the
1980s”).
89. See Matthew Day, Polish Secret Police: How and Why the Poles Spied
on Their Own People, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 18, 2011, 7:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/C88T-MKS6 (describing how the Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa “was
at the forefront of the Polish authoritarian state’s long war against opposition
to communist rule”).
90. See Feldstein, supra note 66, at 42 (“[T]he most advanced surveillance
operations rely on relatively few human agents: Many functions are instead
automated through AI.”).
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technologies can be expensive. The Xinjian authorities, for
example, reportedly budgeted more than $1 billion in the first
quarter of 2017 for the monitoring and detention of the Uyghur
population there.91 Yet this is likely a low figure when compared
with the amount the Chinese state would have spent to
construct a comparable system without using digital
technologies.92
Steven Feldstein attributes the impacts of digital
repression to the increased availability of big data from both
public and private sources, enhanced machine learning and
algorithmic approaches to the processing of that data, and the
corresponding advances in computer processing power.93 As
Feldstein writes, “[f]rom facial-recognition technologies that
cross-check real-time images against massive databases to
algorithms that crawl social media for signs of opposition
activity, these innovations are a game-changer for authoritarian
efforts to shape discourse and crush opposition voices.”94 In
many ways digital technologies have ushered us into a new era,
what Larry Diamond calls “postmodern totalitarianism,” in
which we appear to be free to go about our daily lives, but
governments are controlling and censoring all information
flows.95
Furthermore, digital technologies serve a very specific
function for autocratic states. While leader removal by coups
and civil war defeats are declining, it is increasingly common for
leaders to be removed based on internal pressure and mass

91. See Josh Chin & Clément Bürge, Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How
China’s Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2017,
10:58 PM), https://perma.cc/SM8E-QG8B (“China’s efforts to snuff out a
violent separatist movement . . . have turned the autonomous region of
Xinjiang . . . into a laboratory for high-tech social controls that civil-liberties
activists say the government wants to roll out across the country.”).
92. See Feldstein, supra note 66, at 45–46 (discussing the budget for
“security-related investment projects”).
93. Id. at 41.
94. Id.
95. See Larry Diamond, The Threat of Postmodern Totalitarianism, 20 J.
DEMOCRACY 20, 23 (2019) (comparing this reality to “a nightmarish
modern-day version of Nineteen Eighty-Four”).
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public uprisings.96 In this way, “the gravest threats to
authoritarian survival today may be coming not from insider-led
rebellions, but from discontented publics on the streets or at the
ballot box.”97 Such observations might explain Vladimir Putin’s
response to the December 2011 protests in Russia,98 along with
the color revolutions,99 and Arab Spring.100 These new trends in
leadership removal increase the incentives for leaders to pursue
repressive tactics capable of monitoring public opinion and
mobilization potential.101
As is discussed further in Parts III and IV, the target of
digital repression need not solely be a country’s own citizens.
Surveillance, state-sponsored hacks, election interference, and
misinformation campaigns have all been documented strategies
of autocratic governments’ attempts at destabilizing rivals and
undermining democracy globally.102 In addition to challenging
the functioning of democratic governments, there have also been
attempts to change the behavior of non-state actors in pursuit

96. See Feldstein, supra note 66, at 43 (stating that popular revolt and
electoral defeat “have overtaken coups” as “the most common causes of
departure for dictators”).
97. Id.
98. See Michael Crowley, Why Putin Hates Hillary, POLITICO (July 25,
2016, 6:20 PM), https://perma.cc/2WVT-KW98 (stating Putin blamed Hillary
Clinton for rigging Russian elections and causing the protests).
99. See Yulia Nikitina, The “Color Revolutions” and “Arab Spring” in
Russian Official Discourse, 14 CONNECTIONS 87, 88 (2014) (stating the “main
concern” with the color revolution is that problems are not being resolved
through the constitution or existing laws, but instead through “revolutions”
and “street democracy.”).
100. See id. at 92–93 (discussing Putin’s negative reaction to Western
intervention of parties involved in the Arab Spring).
101. See Feldstein, supra note 66, at 43 (“[A]utocratic leaders are
embracing digital tactics for monitoring, surveilling, and harassing civil
society movements and for distorting elections.”).
102. See Charles Marsh, How Autocratic Regimes Try to Undermine
Democracy at Home and Abroad, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT BORDERS (Dec. 17,
2017), https://perma.cc/U9SJ-HBHP (summarizing recent research on
autocrats’ attempts to weaken democracy using, among other tactics, “internet
censorship and controlled narratives”).
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of a global liberal agenda, such as human rights NGOs. 103
Moreover, while the focus of this Article is mainly on digital
influence from Russia and China, the nature of digital
technologies is impacting which states have the ability to
monitor and repress.104 As the financial and material costs of
digital repression decrease, the capacity to influence is no longer
confined to global powers.105 Finally, much like repression itself,
digital repression is not and will not be confined to autocratic
regimes. Democracies monitor, surveille, and repress their own
citizens, particularly in times of threat.106 We should, therefore,
not only look for digital repression and interference from our
autocratic rivals but acknowledge its potential even within the
most stalwart democracies, including the United States, which
we turn to next.
III. U.S. Efforts to Protect Democratic Institutions
When adversaries interfere with elections, they threaten
more than the integrity of electoral process, they threaten
collective faith in democracy. Indeed, a core focus of the Russian
strategy to undermine confidence in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election was not necessarily to target voting machines directly,
103. See, e.g., Bill Marczak et al., Missing Link: Tibetan Groups Targeted
with 1-Click Mobile Exploits (Citizen Lab 2019), https://perma.cc/R8XL-CQCS
(“[S]enior members of Tibetan groups received malicious links in individually
tailored WhatsApp text exchanges with operators posing as NGO workers,
journalists, and other fake personas.”); JOHN SCOTT-RAILTON ET AL., RECKLESS
VII: WIFE OF JOURNALIST SLAIN IN CARTEL-LINKED KILLING TARGETED WITH
NSO GROUP’S SPYWARE 8–9 (2019), https://perma.cc/X8B6-9SPJ (PDF)
(describing NSO Group’s attempts to target various non-state actors,
including journalists, lawyers, and anti-corruption activists).
104. See Adrian Shahbaz, The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism, in
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2018, 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/53HCC7EK (PDF) (“[A] cohort of countries is moving toward digital
authoritarianism by embracing the Chinese model of extensive censorship and
automated surveillance systems.”).
105. See id. at 9 (listing countries, such as Rwanda, Bahrain, and
Kazakhstan, that use telecommunications infrastructure, AI surveillance, and
trainings in a similar way as China).
106. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 70, at 559 (“[I]ncreased strain and tension
in society and increased dissent (which frequently, but not always, occur
together) have been the most important causes of political authorities
increasing political repression.”).
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but instead to use low-cost techniques through social media and
otherwise to “undermine and distract the Clinton campaign,”
which would, to Russia’s delight, result in a benefit to Donald
Trump’s campaign.107 This is why so many state and private
actors have taken action in response to Russia’s “sweeping and
systematic” interference in both U.S. and European elections,
and why it is so surprising that the U.S. federal government did
not take more comprehensive and decisive action to counter this
ongoing threat ahead of the 2020 election cycle.108 This section
summarizes attempts within the U.S.’s public and private
sectors to improve election security. It concludes by identifying
particular weaknesses in the overall U.S. response to date,
while Part V offers a series of steps for how to fill these
governance gaps.
A.

U.S. Efforts to Safeguard its Election Infrastructure

This section begins by discussing federal and state
protections for voting infrastructure. We next move on to
analyze companion efforts from civil society and the private
sector. After that, we explore U.S. efforts to combat digital
repression and then offer several critiques of U.S. efforts to
make democracy harder to hack.
1.

Federal & State Approaches to Election Security

In the United States, elections are primarily administered
by the states.109 Unlike other countries with federal
governments, such as Australia explored in Part IV, the U.S.
federal government has historically played a minimal role in
107. Eric Geller, Collusion Aside, Mueller Found Abundant Evidence of
Russian Election Plot, POLITICO (Apr. 18, 2019, 12:35 PM),
https://perma.cc/L3S3-9CJZ.
108. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNS., REPORT ON THE
INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION 1 (2019) [hereinafter MUELLER REPORT], https://perma.cc/QBB3QGF4 (PDF) (“The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential
election in sweeping and systematic fashion.”).
109. See Elections & Voting, WHITE HOUSE, https://perma.cc/T7TU-24MA
(stating that the federal government “grant[s] the states wide latitude in how
they administer elections”).
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election oversight.110 Yet, as the Congressional Research Service
has noted, “the federal government . . . has steadily increased
its presence in campaigns and elections in the past fifty years.
Altogether, dozens of congressional committees and federal
agencies could be involved in federal elections under current
law.”111 As a result, there is a patchwork of voting systems
throughout the country, with many states—including core
swing states like Pennsylvania—using outdated voting
machines and, as of August 2019, more than ten using paperless
ballots, which leave no paper trail preventing an effective
post-election audit in the aftermath of a cyber-attack.112 While
the federal government can regulate aspects of federal voting
and appropriate funds for state voting systems 113 along with, of
course, providing for the common defense,114 the political
response at the federal level can, as of this writing, at best be
described as apathetic to election security concerns. 115
110. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45302, FEDERAL ROLE IN
U.S. CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS: AN OVERVIEW i (2018) https://perma.cc/3LYE2SBT (PDF) (“Conventional wisdom holds that the federal government plays
[a] relatively little role in U.S. campaigns and elections.”).
111. Id.
112. See Tim Lau, U.S. Elections Are Still Vulnerable to Foreign Hacking,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/DGY8-WSVC
(“Many states have outdated election security infrastructure . . . .”);
CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO ET AL., DEFENDING ELECTIONS: FEDERAL FUNDING
NEEDS FOR STATE ELECTION SECURITY 4 (2019), https://perma.cc/33FK-UF34
(PDF) (“Aging voting systems often use outdated hardware . . . .”).
113. See Dylan Lynch & Wendy Underhill, Election Security Cybersecurity:
What Legislators (and Others) Need to Know, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS.
(Feb. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/HLJ4-F5MY (stating that the federal
government acts “in an advisory role” to states focused on election security).
114. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power
To . . . provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States.”).
115. See Li Zhou, Republicans Are Still Blocking Election Security Bills
After Mueller’s Testimony, VOX (July 25, 2019, 11:47 AM),
https://perma.cc/42S7-UBHC (explaining that Republicans were blocking
“Democratic efforts to put stronger election security restrictions in place”);
Josh Dawsey et al., As Security Officials Prepare for Russian Attack on 2020
Presidential Race, Trump and Aides Play Down Threat, WASH. POST (Apr. 30,
2019, 8:21 AM), https://perma.cc/Q3CA-G45H (“During discussions in the Oval
Office, Trump has regularly conflated the threat of foreign interference with
attacks on the legitimacy of his election . . . .”).
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Congress did appropriate $380 million for state election
security efforts after the 2016 election,116 along with another
$425 million in December 2019.117 These are steps in the right
direction, and are in line broadly with how much it would cost
to replace paperless voting machines across the nation, and will
allow more states to upgrade their voting equipment and
conduct post-election audits.118 Yet these appropriations did not
stem from any authority created in the aftermath of the 2016
election.119 Instead, these were part of a 2002 bill, the Help
America Vote Act,120 passed as a consequence of the contested
presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore in
2000.121 Multiple bills, some bipartisan, were subsequently
proposed and passed by one of the two chambers of Congress,
but thus far all have stalled.122 In particular, the most widely
reported on bill, the Election Security Act, would have pushed
states to implement back-up paper ballots and would have
provided $1 billion in election security grants for

116. See Press Release, U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, U.S. Election
Assistance Commission to Administer $380 Million in 2018 HAVA Election
Security Funds (Mar. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/2JSH-ZBA2; see also Blake
Paterson & Ally J. Levine, Fund Meant to Protect Elections May Be Too Little,
Too Late, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/YG9X-GAUP
(“[Q]uestions remain about how much [the $380 million set aside for election
infrastructure] will help secure the 2018 election.”).
117. See Miles Parks, Congress Allocates $425 Million for Election Security
in New Legislation, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 16, 2019, 5:02 PM),
https://perma.cc/28PC-GYBT.
118. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., ESTIMATE FOR THE COST OF REPLACING
PAPERLESS, COMPUTERIZED VOTING MACHINES 1, https://perma.cc/5PHX-RABA
(PDF) (estimating the cost would “range [from] $130 million to $400 million”).
119. See GARRETT, supra note 110, at 8 (describing the Help America Vote
Act of 2002).
120. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 252, 116 Stat. 1666.
121. See GARRETT, supra note 110, at 8 (“Congress enacted the Help
America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, after the disputed 2000 presidential
election raised concerns about election administration, ballot design, and
voting equipment around the country.”).
122. See, e.g., Katherine Tully-McManus, House Passes Election Security
Measure Requiring Cybersecurity Safeguards, Paper Ballots, ROLL CALL (Jun.
27, 2019, 4:49 PM), https://perma.cc/4HN6-63DX (noting that “an election
security measure” passed by the House “faces stiff opposition from
Republicans” in the Senate).
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modernization.123 However, Senate Majority Leader, Mitch
McConnell, argued that such a bill would federalize the election
process and take control away from states.124
The Senate Intelligence Committee released a report in
2019 on the 2016 election and provided recommendations for
securing elections.125 These recommendations—including the
need for paper ballots—have yet to be implemented in any
concerted way.126 In addition, a widely disseminated report from
the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine,
entitled Securing the Vote, put together a series of
recommendations, which included: election administrators
“routinely assess[ing] the integrity of voter registration
databases,” ensuring backups for pollbooks should disruptions
occur, conducting regular penetration testing, requiring paper
ballots along with post-election audits and the removal of
“[v]oting machines that do not provide the capacity for
independent auditing,” and empowering the National Institute
for Standards and Technology (NIST) to “develop security
standards and verification and validation protocols for
electronic pollbooks in addition to the standards and verification
and validation protocols they have developed for voting
systems.”127 However, most of these recommendations have
similarly not been acted upon as of this writing.128

123. See Maggie Miller, 2020 Democrats Accelerate Push for Action to
Secure Elections, HILL (June 30, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/79KU-S5JZ
(describing the bill as a way to “strengthen cybersecurity information sharing
and require all jurisdictions to perform post-election audits”).
124. See id. (reporting McConnell’s argument); see also Alex Padill, What
Do States Need to Secure Upcoming Elections?, PBS NEWS HOUR (Aug. 2, 2018,
6:30 PM), https://perma.cc/2RXM-RGKR (asserting that election security
should be viewed as a matter of national defense, to which $700 billion is
dedicated each year).
125. S. REP. NO. 116-XX, at 54 (2019), https://perma.cc/5Q3Y-N78L (PDF).
126. See Dana Farrington, READ: Senate Intelligence Report on Russian
Interference in the 2016 Election, NAT. PUB. RADIO (July 25, 2019, 3:08 PM),
https://perma.cc/NY7Y-FK8M (stating “Congress has been slow to take action”
on the report’s recommendations).
127. SECURING THE VOTE, supra note 22, at 5–7.
128. C.f. Miller, supra note 123 (noting that as of June 2019, the year
following the Securing the Vote report, a technology entrepreneur was still
concerned about “foreign interference in elections”).
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As a matter of national defense, election security has
received more attention at the federal level through agencies
such as the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of
Defense, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National
Security Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. 129 Most
notably, DHS designated the election infrastructure130 as
critical infrastructure.131 This means that DHS can offer states
resources and intelligence insights to ensure election security.132
It does not mean, however, the same degree of regulatory
oversight as is common in other jurisdictions, such as the
European Union discussed in Part IV. Despite a multitude of
efforts, the pains taken by various U.S. agencies and
departments have been relatively ad hoc and siloed.133 This is
likely why the Director of National Intelligence established the
position of Intelligence Community Election Threats Executive

129. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11265, CAMPAIGN AND
ELECTION
SECURITY
POLICY:
BRIEF
INTRODUCTION
1–2
(2019)
https://perma.cc/5QZ7-N2P4 (PDF) (discussing agency roles in election
security).
130. “Election infrastructure” includes “storage facilities, polling places,
and centralized vote tabulations locations used to support the election process,
and information and communications technology to include voter registration
databases, voting machines, and other systems to manage the election process
and report and display results on behalf of state and local governments.” Press
Release, Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary
Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical
Infrastructure Subsector (Jan. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/LGD8-D5BJ; see
Danielle Root et al., Election Security in All 50 States: Defending America’s
Elections, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 12, 2018, 12:01 AM),
https://perma.cc/T9LE-DWDS (describing election infrastructure across the
country).
131. See Johnson, supra note 130 (“Given the vital role elections play in
this country, it has been determined that certain systems and assets of
election infrastructure meet the definition of critical infrastructure.”).
132. See Kaveh Waddell, Why Elections Are Now Classified as ‘Critical
Infrastructure,’ ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/6GXU-GP6D (“[The
classification] makes it easier for DHS to offer [state and local organizations]
resources and intelligence information.”).
133. See Julian E. Barnes, Intelligence Chief Names New Election Security
Oversight Official, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/83TU-5CNU
(noting that analysts viewed the intelligence community’s increased focus on
election security before the 2018 midterm races as rather impromptu).
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(ETE) in July of 2019.134 The goal of that position is to coordinate
election security activities across the federal government.135
Another useful step in this same vein has been the creation of
Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (EI-ISAC) to help share information about cyber threats
and best practices with election agencies and other interested
stakeholders.136 But it is still unclear whether such coordination
will ultimately address the problems associated with election
insecurity in the United States, to say nothing of other
vulnerable democracies.
At the state level, many state and local governments have
organized and funded their own initiatives to improve election
security in the absence of effective federal leadership. 137 For
example, California created the Office of Elections
Cybersecurity.138 Virginia switched from paperless electronic
voting to a statewide paper ballot system.139 Colorado instituted
a risk-limiting audit that is being emulated by other states.140
Indiana passed a plan to phase out paperless voting machines

134. Press Release, Daniel R. Coats, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Director of
National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats Establishes Intelligence Community
Election Threats Executive (July 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/V77W-AGS7.
135. See id. (“[T]he . . . Election Threats Executive (ETE) . . . will
coordinate and integrate all election security activities, initiatives, and
programs across the [Intelligence Community] and synchronize intelligence
efforts in support of the broader U.S. government.”).
136. See Elections Infrastructure ISAC, CTR. FOR INTERNET SEC.,
https://perma.cc/93ZZ-QUT7.
137. See Root et al., supra note 130 (describing New York’s new election
security initiative, among others).
138. See Sara Friedman, California Creates Elections Security Office, GCN
(Aug. 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/6635-PH67 (reporting on the new
organization).
139. See Root et al., supra note 130 (describing Virginia’s switch to a paper
ballot system).
140. See Jesse Paul, Colorado’s First-of-its-Kind Election Audit Is
Complete, with All Participating Counties Passing, DENVER POST (Nov. 22,
2017, 1:59 PM), https://perma.cc/D6RK-P5DF (stating the process involves the
“manual recount of a sample of ballots from the more than 50 counties that
had elections this year and compar[ing] them with how they were interpreted
by tabulating machines”).
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fully by 2029.141 In total, as of this writing at least thirty-six
states have made efforts to improve and are working with DHS
or the National Guard to assess and identify voting systems. 142
However, wait times for help, especially with DHS, are
reportedly very long (up to nine months), and with state and
local elections happening multiple times per year, it is likely
that vulnerabilities will go unaddressed for several more
election cycles.143
2.

Private Sector & Civil Society Efforts

In the United States (and unlike Australia, as we will see),
election security has very deep ties with the private sector and
is a topic watched closely, but largely passively, by civil society
organizations and academia.144 The private sector plays such a
strong role because voting machines are manufactured without
direct government involvement and are only subject to ex post
testing.145 Thus, among the first lines of defense of election
infrastructure security lies primarily in the hands of private
voting machine manufacturers, who despite the various stress
tests required by many states, produce equipment that may still
141. See Tom Davies, Indiana Election Upgrade Leaves Widespread
Paperless Voting, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/79GSJBNK (noting that paperless voting machines are not prohibited until 2029).
142. See Root et al., supra note 130 (explaining that those states are
working with federal entities in “assessing and identifying potential threats
to voter registration systems”).
143. See Tim Starks, The Latest 2018 Election-Hacking Threat: 9-Month
Wait for Government Help, POLITICO (Dec. 29, 2017, 5:05 AM),
https://perma.cc/RRY9-UGJD (“[S]ome states might not get the service until
weeks before the November midterms and may remain unaware of flaws that
could allow homegrown cyber vandals or foreign intelligence agencies to target
voter registration databases and election offices’ computer networks . . . .”).
144. See Joseph Marks, The Cybersecurity 202: Even a Voting Machine
Company Is Pushing for Election Security Legislation, WASH. POST (June 10,
2019, 7:13 AM), https://perma.cc/PU7B-V2PJ (noting that because one
company’s “commitment to third-party testing is entirely voluntary, it also
gets to say who those third-party testers are”).
145. See id. (reporting that the company urged Congress to pass legislation
that would “mandate security testing of voting equipment by outside
researchers”); Tim Starks, Voting Machine Vendors Under Pressure, POLITICO
(July 12, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://perma.cc/LE5U-KQWG (stating that voting
machine vendors sell electronic voting machines without paper backups).
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contain vulnerabilities that can go undetected.146 While
manufacturers have taken steps to boost election infrastructure
security, such as by refusing to sell paperless machines to those
jurisdictions that do not have paper voting machines as their
primary machines, machines continue to be in operation
without any serious recall regime in place and there are no legal
obligations to notify election officials when vulnerabilities and
breaches are detected.147 “I know America’s voting machines are
vulnerable,” said J. Alex Halderman during Congressional
testimony, “because my colleagues and I have hacked
them—repeatedly—as part of a decade of research studying the
technology that operates elections and learning how to make it
stronger.”148 He has gone on to argue: “Our highly computerized
election infrastructure is vulnerable to sabotage and even to
cyberattacks that could change votes.”149
Halderman demonstrated, for example, how a mock contest
between George Washington and Benedict Arnold could be won
by the latter, simply by infecting a voting machine’s memory
with malware.150 The vulnerabilities that Halderman and his
group have exploited include not only outdated voting machines,
but also election-management systems that design ballots,
which election officials often access via memory cards that may

146. For a list of standards and tests required of voting machines, see
Voting System Standards, Testing and Certification, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGIS. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/4JHL-V3VG.
147. See Lily Hay Newman, Election Security Is Still Hurting at Every
Level, WIRED (June 6, 2019, 12:01 AM), [hereinafter Newman I]
https://perma.cc/H8XC-QHHR (quoting the president of Verified Voting, as
saying that “I don’t think the for-profit commercial model works particularly
well for voting systems, because there’s not enough profit in them to do really
good R&D”).
148. Steve Freiss, Hacking the Vote: It’s Easier Than You Think, MICH.
ALUMNI ASS’N, https://perma.cc/J9QA-D6SX.
149. Alexander Freund, Democracy in Danger: Elections are Easy to
Manipulate, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Oct. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/7Q63-LXBG.
150. See Jen Schwartz, The Vulnerabilities of Our Voting Machines, SCI.
AM. (Nov. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/GP64-2MHX (“[W]ithout a paper trail of
each vote, neither the voters nor a human auditor could check for
discrepancies. In real elections, too, about 20 percent of voters nationally still
cast electronic ballots only.”).
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be corrupted.151 Other cybersecurity researchers have
corroborated these findings, including those affiliated with the
Defcon hacker conference, and found numerous vulnerabilities
in many voting machines still in use across more than
twenty-six states in 2019.152
Within
civil
society
and
academia,
numerous
comprehensive reports on election security have been written
exploring what to do about these problems.153 The most notable
of these publications include the National Academies of
Sciences’ Securing the Vote mentioned above; the Brennan
Center for Justice at New York University School of Law’s
Defending Elections; and the Center for American Progress’s
Election Security in All 50 States.154 However, once again,
because of political stagnation, there has been very little
implementation of their policy proposals.155 As for active
participation in election security, some universities play a role
in certifying and testing voting machines, but this role is
limited.156
B.

U.S. Attempts to Combat Digital Repression

Unlike the tentative steps that have been taken to protect
U.S. election infrastructure, the U.S. government’s response to
misinformation remains nascent, which is in part due to
demanding requirements of the First Amendment and deep
151. See id. (discussing how malicious code can be introduced to the
election-management systems).
152. See Lily Hay Newman, Some Voting Machines Still Have Decade-Old
Vulnerabilities, WIRED (Sept. 26, 2019, 2:41 PM), https://perma.cc/S6E7-L38X
[hereinafter Newman II] (highlighting “detailed vulnerability findings related
to six models of voting machines” including one model “used in 28 states in
2018” and another model “used in 26 states that same year”).
153. See, e.g., SECURING THE VOTE, supra note 22, at xii (outlining
numerous recommendations “designed to harden our election infrastructure
and safeguard its integrity and credibility”).
154. See generally id.; DELUZIO, supra note 112; Root, supra note 130.
155. See supra notes 115–143 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-241(b) (West 2020) (allowing
Connecticut’s Secretary of State to enter into agreements with universities to
assist with ensuring the integrity of voting equipment); see also IND. CODE.
ANN. § 3-11-16-4 (West 2020) (allowing Indiana election officials to work with
universities to perform audits and assist with certifications).
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divisions about the proper role of the federal government in
policing content.157 There are, however, a patchwork of state
laws aimed at combatting the effects of misinformation.158 One
example is a California law that requires the state’s Department
of Education to provide a list of education materials on its
websites to teach students how to distinguish misinformation
from real news and advertisements.159 The impetus behind the
law was a Stanford University study,160 which found that 82
percent of middle school students could not distinguish between
advertisements and news stories. 161 Other states have followed
suit, by including more programming related to misinformation
and disinformation in their educational programming.162
Congress has unsuccessfully tried to pass the Honest Ads
Act,163 a bill that requires platform political ads to follow the
same rules as the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, such

157. See Sara Prendergast, It Must be True, I Read It on the Internet:
Regulating Fake News in the Digital Age, MICH. TECH. L. REV. (Mar. 4, 2019),
https://perma.cc/8UYS-ULF2 (discussing the hesitancy of the United States to
combat misinformation); John Samples, Why the Government Should Not
Regulate Content Moderation of Social Media, CATO INST. (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://perma.cc/E5DP-RK8T (noting that a California bill aimed at reducing
the spread of misinformation on social media through the creation of an
advisory board was vetoed by former Governor Jerry Brown, citing First
Amendment concerns).
158. See Funke & Flamini, supra note 28 (listing state actions).
159. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51206.4 (West 2020) (ordering California’s
Department of Education to provide a list of resources on media literacy); see
also Funke & Flamini, supra note 28 (noting that California is one of a few
states to enact legislation promoting media literacy); Susan Minichiello,
California Now Has a Law to Bolster Media Literacy in Schools, PRESS
DEMOCRAT (Sept. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/7VBR-RSKW (reporting that
Gov. Jerry Brown signed the bill to encourage media literacy).
160. See Minichiello, supra note 159 (discussing the bill’s origins).
161. See SAM WINEBURG ET AL., EVALUATING INFORMATION: THE
CORNERSTONE OF CIVIC ONLINE REASONING 10 (2016), https://perma.cc/FC3T9VQ6 (PDF) (“More than 80% of students believed that the [fake]
advertisement . . . was a real news story.”).
162. See Funke & Flamini, supra note 28 (stating that at least twenty-four
states are attempting to improve media literacy).
163. S. 1989, 115th Cong. (2017).
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as identifying the organization or person sponsoring the ad.164
In addition, the Act would require platforms to engage in
“reasonable efforts” to ensure that ads are not purchased
“directly or indirectly” by foreign governments.165 Major tech
companies have strongly opposed such a bill, arguing instead for
self-regulation.166 Some, such as Twitter, have come out with
new limits—and even bans—on political ads on their platforms
due, in part, to concerns over enabling the spread of
misinformation,167 but as of this writing Facebook has not
followed suit.168
C.

Critiques of U.S. Response

While there are many efforts afoot within the public and
private sectors to improve the security of U.S. election
infrastructure and combat digital repression, as the foregoing
analysis made clear there remains a great deal to be done.
Consider the work done at Defcon since 2017 that was
referenced above.169 Defcon is the world’s largest “white hat”
164. See id. (requiring advertisement sponsors to provide their name,
address, phone number, etc.); see also Tim Lau, The Honest Ads Act Explained,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 17, 2020) https://perma.cc/G56T-HJH8 (noting
that the Honest Ads Act is still a proposed law before the United States
Senate).
165. Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong.; see Natasha Bertrand,
Senators Have a New Plan to Fix a Major Loophole that Let Russia Take
Advantage of Facebook and Tech Giants, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://perma.cc/VF2B-7H3A (stating that the Act’s requirements are a
departure from the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971).
166. See Ben Brody & Bill Allison, Lobbying Group for Facebook and
Google to Pitch Self-Regulation of Ads, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2017, 8:49 PM),
https://perma.cc/3VRB-VCFR (“[G]oogle, Facebook, and Twitter . . . pitch
self-regulation instead of a proposed federal law requiring more disclosure for
political advertising on their online platforms . . . .”).
167. See Kate Conger, Twitter Will Ban All Political Ads, C.E.O. Jack
Dorsey Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q2L3-T6XG
(“Twitter announce[d] that it would eliminate political ads, starting Nov. 22,
[2019].”).
168. See Danielle Abril, Google and Twitter Changed Their Rules on
Political Ads. Why Won’t Facebook?, FORTUNE (Nov. 22, 2019), (“Despite a
recent political ad ban from Twitter and new limitations from Google,
Facebook has yet to back down from its ‘anything goes’ policy.”).
169. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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hacker conference, and it reports out the numerous ways its
participants have been able to hack into U.S. voting machines
annually.170 In its 2018 report, conference participants found,
among other vulnerabilities, that: (1) a tabulator used by
twenty-three states could be hacked via a network attack; (2) a
machine used in eighteen states was able to be hacked within
two minutes, which is remarkable considering that it takes the
average voter six minutes to vote; and (3) hackers had the
ability to wirelessly reprogram an electronic card used by many
Americans to activate the voting terminal.171 The latter issue
would allow a single voter to cast multiple ballots in a given
voting session.172 As Senator Ron Wyden said at Defcon in 2019,
“Election officials across the country as we speak are buying
election systems that will be out of date the moment they open
the box.”173 He added: “[This is] the election security equivalent
of putting our military out there to go up against superpowers
with a peashooter.”174
The vulnerabilities exposed at Defcon stem from the lack of
comprehensive federal and state oversight discussed above.
Leaving voting machine hardware and software to the private

170. See Taylor Telford, Hackers Were Told to Break into U.S. Voting
Machines. They Didn’t Have Much Trouble., WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2019),
https://perma.cc/T85A-YCKJ (reporting on a conference that involves skilled
hackers attempting to break into U.S. voting machines); see generally MATT
BLAZE ET AL., DEF CON 26 VOTING VILLAGE: REPORT ON CYBER VULNERABILITIES
IN U.S. ELECTION EQUIPMENT, DATABASES, AND INFRASTRUCTURE (2018),
https://perma.cc/H7F8-LCV4 (PDF) [hereinafter DEFCON 2018] (reporting the
findings of the Voting Village in 2018); MATT BLAZE ET AL., DEF CON 25 VOTING
MACHINE HACKING VILLAGE: REPORT ON CYBER VULNERABILITIES IN U.S.
ELECTION
EQUIPMENT,
DATABASES,
AND
INFRASTRUCTURE
(2017),
https://perma.cc/5Y83-ZLWV (PDF) [hereinafter DEFCON 2017] (discussing the
findings from the 2017 Voting Village).
171. See DEFCON 2018, supra note 170, at 5 (noting various vulnerabilities
in the U.S. voting process); see also Lily Hay Newman, Voting Machines Are
Still Absurdly Vulnerable to Attacks, WIRED (Sept. 28, 2018, 11:04 AM),
https://perma.cc/K3HW-CA82 [hereinafter Newman III] (“Many of the
weaknesses Voting Village participants found were frustratingly basic,
underscoring the need for a reckoning with manufacturers.”).
172. See DEFCON 2018, supra note 170, at 21 (explaining the
vulnerabilities).
173. Telford, supra note 170.
174. Id.
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sector without adequate regulatory oversight is insufficient to
protect election security.175 Moreover, the failure of effective
federal oversight has meant a greater burden on state and local
officials, who often do not have the expertise necessary to
compare and assess the quality of voting systems when making
purchasing decisions.176 Some with the means and will, such as
Los Angeles, with its $300 million Voting Solutions for All
People program, have taken it upon themselves to make major
investments in new technology and practices, but these are
outliers.177 Furthermore, many state and local governments
remain insufficiently trained to respond to cybersecurity
threats178 and still more jurisdictions are using voter databases
that are over a decade old—a lifetime in tech terms.179 The
continued weakness of the U.S. response leaves election security
a “significant counterintelligence threat,”180 which adversaries
may continue to exploit, along with abusing social media firms
with lax policies to combat digital repression.181
The United States is not alone in facing these
vulnerabilities, though. Both advanced and emerging
democracies around the world are similarly grappling with how
175. See Newman III, supra note 171 (detailing the “nation’s vulnerable
election infrastructure”).
176. See Newman II, supra note 152 (“[W]e’re still using antiquated
equipment that should be replaced, both for security and reliability
reasons . . . [which] is one reason why Congress and the states need to step up
on election security spending.” (quoting the deputy director of Brennan
Center’s Democracy Program)).
177. See Matt Stiles, Sweeping Change Is Coming for L.A. County Voters.
If Things Go Wrong, He’ll Get the Blame, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://perma.cc/27GC-NK42 (PDF) (stating that major investments into
better election technology is rare).
178. See Elizabeth Warren, My Plan to Strengthen Our Democracy,
MEDIUM (June 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/WK9T-PDQ7 (noting that a number
of states do not train election officials to deal with cyber security threats).
179. See id. (“Forty-two states use voter registration databases that are
more than a decade old.”).
180. Julian E. Barnes & Adam Goldman, F.B.I. Warns of Russian
Interference in 2020 Race and Boosts Counterintelligence Operations, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/AXD3-TRDN (quoting FBI Director
Christopher Wray).
181. See id. (citing weak social media policies as a contributor to mass
misinformation).
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best to enhance the security and integrity of their own elections
and democratic societies. Part IV focuses on some of these
efforts, notably from the European Union, Asia, Australia, and
Oceania. Implications for policymakers stemming from this
analysis are explored in Part V.
IV.

Lessons from Other Democracies

Aside from the United States, other advanced and emerging
democracies around the world are working to manage threats to
their own election security, as well as creating strategies to
manage digital repression and disinformation. These efforts
form only one component of a larger debate happening around
enhancing cybersecurity, which in turn suffers from a lack of
clear definition. According to former General Michael Hayden,
for example, “rarely has something been so important and so
talked about with less clarity and less apparent understanding
[than cybersecurity].”182 This Part surveys some of these efforts
to help provide a framework for discussion in Part V, which in
turn considers a range of potential reforms to help make
democracy harder to hack.
A.

European Union

This section begins by discussing EU protections for voting
infrastructure. We next move on to analyze companion efforts
from civil society, and the private sector.

182. Michael V. Hayden, The Future of Things Cyber, 5 STRATEGIC STUD.
Q. 3, 3 (2011); see Karen O’Donoghue, Some Perspectives on Cybersecurity,
INTERNET SOC’Y (Nov. 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/49V2-L5SW (noting that the
Internet Society maintains that “as a catchword, cybersecurity is frighteningly
inexact and can stand for an almost endless list of different security concerns,
technical challenges, and ‘solutions’ ranging from the technical to the
legislative”).
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EU Efforts to Safeguard its Election Infrastructure

Europeans went to the polls in 2019 for the first time in five
years for widely anticipated elections.183 Cybersecurity was a
key concern going into the summer after a series of high-profile
breaches and disinformation campaigns.184 For example,
electoral websites in the Netherlands were targeted by
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in 2017,185 as was the elections
oversight body in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic.186 Evidence
is mounting as well of manipulation of the 2016 Brexit debate
through the use of Facebook data.187 As revealed by
whistleblower Christopher Wylie at a hearing in the European
Parliament, it is “almost certain that systematic fraud and voter
deception took place . . . [and that] Facebook’s system allowed it
to happen.”188 Other recent examples include the release of
thousands of internal documents of then French presidential
candidate Emmanuel Macron prior to his 2017 election
victory.189 However, unlike the DNC hack of 2016, this breach
did not have a major impact on the French elections given that:
(1) French media were prohibited from reporting on the breach
within forty-four hours of the election; (2) the lack of a “thriving
tabloid culture” in France as in the UK, or the equivalent of a
Fox News Network; and (3) the actions of the Macron campaign

183. See John Borland, As Europe Went to the Polls, Cyber Election Efforts
Paid Off, SYMANTEC (June 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/96WB-8NME (stating
that the election hacks of 2016 contributed to the anticipation of the election
cycle).
184. See id. (noting that Europe had a prodigious focus on cybersecurity
during the election cycle).
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, New Evidence Emerges of Steve Bannon and
Cambridge Analytica’s Role in Brexit, NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 2018),
https://perma.cc/NM8N-Y6RA (citing evidence of Facebook data being used to
interfere with Brexit debate).
188. Freund, supra note 149.
189. See Andy Greenberg, Hackers Hit Macron with Huge Email Leak
Ahead of French Election, WIRED (May 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/9UGY-97K7
(describing the “data dump” that occurred less than forty hours before France’s
election).
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in releasing faked documents to mislead the attackers.190 There
have also been spear phishing campaigns aimed at “German
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union”
party,191 along with successful cyber-attacks on the German
parliament (Bundestag),192 and its federal data network.193 In
those attacks, the hackers had worked their way so deep into
the system that the entire Bundestag IT architecture had to be
rebuilt.194 The breadth of these attacks remind us that a
multifaceted approach is essential to the issues associated with
influence, repression, and manipulation.
To its credit, the European Union has taken a more
proactive approach to managing the full range of cyber-enabled
threats facing the integrity of its democratic systems including
both election security and disinformation than the United
States has managed to date. First, most EU nations have
minimized the use of technology in elections, with the
Netherlands rejecting the use of electronic voting machines
(EVMs) entirely,195 France backing away from the use of online
voting after 2016,196 and Germany stopping the use of EVMs due
to a court order in 2005,197 just to name a few national actions.
Among the more important of these is the Network Information
Security (NIS) Directive, which was adopted by the European

190. See Rachel Donadio, Why the Macron Hacking Attack Landed with a
Thud in France, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/425H-VQXE
(explaining the “bereft coverage” of the hack).
191. Borland, supra note 183.
192. See Hack on German Government Network ‘Ongoing,’ DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Jan. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/AD9S-PNPK (discussing the hack on
the German Parliament and the controversy surrounding the German
government’s response).
193. See id. (reporting the cyber-attack on Germany’s main network).
194. See id. (“[S]ecurity officials were taken aback by the sophistication of
the attack, which had exceeded levels of complexity previously seen.”).
195. See Borland, supra note 183 (“The Netherlands rejected the use of
electronic voting machines in the 2000s, after studies showed they were
susceptible to fraud.”).
196. See id.
197. See The Constitutionality of Electronic Voting in Germany, NDI,
https://perma.cc/X5W3-7CG2 (“The German Constitutional Court upheld the
first argument . . . that the use of [electronic] voting machines was
unconstitutional.”).
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Parliament in 2016 and was the first comprehensive piece of EU
wide cybersecurity legislation.198
The NIS Directive requires that EU Member States work in
cooperation199 to improve cybersecurity risk management.200
Unlike other attempts to combat cyber related issues, the NIS
Directive expects nations to exchange information through
Cooperation Groups, which may be considered a form of
international ISAC.201 Of particular note to the readers, the
2018 Compendium on Cyber Security of Election Technology
summarized a wide array of election security best practices,
including: “[A]nti-DoS protections, access control and
authentication procedures for election IT systems, digital
signatures and duplicate data-entry practices to ensure data
integrity, network flow analysis and logging procedures, and
network segmentation.”202
Despite the progress, it is important to note the
Compendium takes a balanced, realistic approach to embracing
cybersecurity. As pointed out by the report, despite the
198. See Council Directive 2016/1148, 2016 O.J. (L 194) 1.
199. See id. at 1–2 (“A Cooperation Group, composed of representatives of
Member States, the Commission, and the European Union Agency for
Network and Information Security (‘ENISA’), should be established to support
and facilitate strategic cooperation between the Member States regarding the
security of network and information systems.”).
200. See A Cyber Security Framework for Europe, CORDIS,
https://perma.cc/3UZY-WNJ5 (last updated Aug. 5, 2014) (discussing the EU’s
plan to enhance cybersecurity).
201. See Council Directive 2016/1148, supra note 198, at 11 (creating
Cooperation Groups to facilitate cooperation and the exchange of information).
202. Borland, supra note 183. The EU’s groundbreaking General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) is also a relevant and useful regime to better
protect personal data, including with regards to political preferences. This is
an expansive regulatory regime with a wide array of requirements on covered
firms ranging from ensuring data portability and consent to mandating that
firms disclose a data breach within seventy-two hours of becoming aware of
the incident and then conducting a postmortem to ensure that a similar
scenario will not recur. See Top 10 Operational Responses to the GDPR, INT’L
ASS’N PRIV. PRO., https://perma.cc/Y3MM-LMH7 (providing access to different
commentary related to the GDPR). However, some nations have been
criticized by the likes of Privacy International for creating exceptions to GDPR
safeguards for political parties. See Ailidh Callander, GDPR Loopholes
Facilitate Data Exploitation by Political Parties, GDPR TODAY (Mar. 25, 2019),
https://perma.cc/ECG4-SAMV.
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widespread use of analogue practices and paper ballots, cyber
threats are not eliminated given that these same jurisdictions
may still “rely on electronic solutions for voter and candidate
registration, vote counting or the communication of the results”
that could be susceptible to cyber-attacks, along with the myriad
other risks shown in Table 1.203 As such, the EU also embraces
the use of risk-limiting audits that both monitor and ensure
robust election security; however, these remain to be widely
implemented across the EU.204
2.

EU Efforts to Combat Digital Repression

As highlighted in Part II, faith in the democratic process
also demands a firm commitment to combatting digital
repression, including the need to manage disinformation. For
example, in 2018, then President of the European Commission
Jean-Claude Juncker said: “We must protect our free and fair
elections.”205 As such, the EU Commission proposed new rules
building from the work of the Compendium to “better protect
our democratic processes from manipulation by third countries
or private interests.”206 In particular, in 2018 the European
Commission pushed Facebook, Google, and Twitter to sign the
“Code of Practice on Disinformation,”207 committing them to
boost “transparency around political and issue-based
advertising.”208
This initiative was groundbreaking since the technology
industry agreed “to self-regulatory standards to fight

203. COMPENDIUM, supra note 33, at 9.
204. See id. at 25 (“Testing and auditing are the cornerstones of network
and information system security, as they are the only methods of gaining a
practical assurance of functionality and security. Therefore, testing and
auditing need to take a comprehensive and multifaceted approach.”).
205. European Commission Press Release IP/18/5681, State of the Union
2018: European Commission Proposes Measures for Securing Free and Fair
European Elections (Sept. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/4RF2-7P7P.
206. Id.
207. European Union, Code of Practice on Disinformation (2018)
https://perma.cc/9C26-HL67 (PDF) [hereinafter Code on Disinformation].
208. Id.; see Borland, supra note 183 (noting that Microsoft has also
expressed its desire to join the Code).
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disinformation.”209 Among other provisions, the Code requires
signatories to cull fake accounts, create safeguards against
misrepresentation, and the misuse of automated bots, along
with empowering consumers and the broader research
community.210 In response, these firms have set up “searchable
political-ad databases” and have begun to take down
“disruptive, misleading or false” information from their
platforms, and to reject ads that are inconsistent with election
integrity policies.211 In 2019, Twitter rolled out a reporting
feature in which individuals can report a tweet with misleading
information by clicking on a drop down menu, select “It’s
misleading about voting,” choose an option that explains how
the tweet is misleading, and submit the report to Twitter.212
Unfortunately, this did not seem to have the impact desired, as
several organizations reported EU election hashtags, such as
#EUElections2019, still “received a high level of suspiciously
inorganic engagement.”213 Similarly, an activist group called
Avaaz found that, despite these efforts, that there were more
than “500 far-right and anti-EU Facebook pages and groups”
being followed by some thirty-two million people.214
In a similar regulatory vein, the Commission underscored
the need for greater transparency in online political
advertisements and targeting.215 It also sought further
regulation of online advertising campaigns such as by
“disclosing which party or political support group is behind
online political advertisements as well as by publishing
information on targeting criteria used to disseminate
information to citizens,”216 and even called for national
209. Code on Disinformation, supra note 207.
210. See id. (listing requirements to protect against disinformation).
211. Id.
212. See Foo Yun Chee, Twitter Unveils New Tool Against EU Elections
Meddlers, REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/L3WS-4MJX (explaining
the new reporting feature).
213. Kevin Townsend, Research Shows Twitter Manipulation in Weeks
Before EU Elections, SEC. WEEK (May 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q37M-CR8B.
214. Borland, supra note 183.
215. See Townsend, supra note 213 (discussing the “large scale political
social engineering through social media”).
216. European Commission Press Release IP/18/5681, supra note 205.
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sanctions for the failure to comply with the new disclosure
requirements.217 And, to address potential difficulties arising
from cyberinfrastructure issues in elections, the Commissions
called for the
creation of a Network of Cybersecurity
Competence Centers, in cooperation amongst the EU Member
States, to better target and coordinate available funding for
cybersecurity cooperation, research and innovation.218
In a more widespread regulatory initiative, in June of 2019,
the European Commission produced a report on the
implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation
(“Report”).219 The Action Plan proposes a set of actions that
should further enable a joint and coordinated EU approach to
addressing disinformation. The Action Plan focuses on four
pillars:
(1) Improving the capabilities of the Union’s institutions to
detect, analyze, and expose disinformation;
(2) Strengthening coordinated and joint responses by EU
institutions and Member States to disinformation;
(3) Mobilizing the private sector to tackle disinformation;
and
(4) Raising awareness about disinformation and improving
societal resilience.220

Within these pillars are previously unexplored areas of
enhancements, which are not often considered within the
217. See id. (noting that the sanctions would be imposed for the illegal use
of personal data to influence the outcome of European elections).
218. See Commission Proposal for a European Cybersecurity Competence
Network and Centre, COM (2018) 630 final (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://perma.cc/T2YS-CYKR (PDF) (“[T]he initiative will help to create an
inter-connected, Europe-wide cybersecurity industrial and research
ecosystem.”).
219. See generally Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions Concerning the Tackling of Online
Disinformation, COM (2018) 236 final (Apr. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/C847EPFX (PDF) [hereinafter Tackling Disinformation].
220. See Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions Action Plan against Disinformation, at 5, COM
(2018) 36 final (May 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/R8TE-L5CP (PDF) (stating the
four pillars).
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context of cybersecurity. For example, in the area of
communications, the European Commission declared the
importance of supporting quality journalism as an essential
element of a democratic society and “[c]ountering internal and
external
disinformation
threats
through
strategic
communication” while safeguarding the diversity and
sustainability of the European news media ecosystem.221
The Action Plan encourages a “more transparent,
trustworthy and accountable online ecosystem” while “fostering
education and media literacy” to secure resilient election
processes.222 Key to this plan is the improvement of societal
resilience in Europe and beyond to foster critical thinking and
media-literate citizens.223 This requires focus to be placed on
improving the detection, analysis, and exposure of
disinformation by investing in digital tools, data analysis skills,
and specialized staff as well as strengthening efforts to assess
the reach and impact of disinformation.224 To accomplish such a
lofty goal across the European Union, the Members will
necessarily need to strengthen their cooperation and joint
responses to disinformation as described above.225
One such attempt at coordination exists in the EU’s Rapid
Alert System.226 The system is designed to provide warnings on
221. See Tackling Disinformation, supra note 219, at 15. Building a more
knowledgeable, media-savvy user, though, is no simple matter. Trust in media
outlets takes time to build. We attach a given level of trust to an outlet based
on our view of the institution, the organization, and our prior experience with
the individual reporter. Yet, in the digital world, journalists proliferate, and
no system of verifiable trustworthiness yet exists.
222. Id. at 12.
223. See id. (“The life-long development of critical and digital competences,
in particular for young people, is crucial to reinforce the resilience of our
societies to disinformation.”).
224. See id. at 9 (noting that “[a]n effective response [to disinformation]
requires a solid body of facts and evidence on the spread of disinformation and
its impact” and advocating for “[a]dditional data gathering and analysis by
fact-checkers and academic researchers”).
225. See supra notes 183–204 and accompanying text.
226. See European Commission Memo/18/6648, Questions and
Answers—The EU Steps Up Action Against Disinformation (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://perma.cc/596S-YW36 (PDF) (rationalizing the planned system by
noting that “[a] strong European response requires Member States and EU
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disinformation campaigns in real-time and national contact
points for disinformation in the Member States.227 It is designed
to share real-time warnings, react and ensure coordination
between EU capitals and Brussels, and has been active since
March 2019.228 A joint EU sanctions regime goes along with the
early-warning system to better deter adversarial nations such
as Russia from interfering with European Parliament
elections,229 though the effectiveness of this approach has been
called into question.230 In short, criticism has arisen that “[i]t’s
not rapid. There are no alerts. And there’s no system.” 231 Core
issues—such as the level at which an alarm should be sounded
and how to incentivize robust, real-time information
sharing—remain to be resolved.232
institutions to work together much more closely, and to help each other
understand and confront the threat”).
227. See id. (outlining the system’s goals and defining disinformation as
“verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and
disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public—distorts
public debate, undermines citizens’ trust in institutions and media, and even
destabilises democratic processes such as elections”).
228. See Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan Against
Disinformation, at 2–3, JOIN (2019) 12 final (June 14, 2019),
https://perma.cc/7UYU-PRS8 (PDF).
229. See id. at 8 (describing the recent adoption of legal measures
providing for sanctions to deter and respond to cyber-attacks).
230. See Matt Apuzzo, Europe Built a System to Fight Russian Meddling.
It’s Struggling., N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/G5UR-TDVA
(highlighting disagreement over the success of the Rapid Alert System and
noting critiques that the system is hampered by internal politics and
incomplete, disorganized data collection).
231. Id.
232. See id. (noting that disagreement over when to sound an alarm has
led to no alerts being issued and that only one-third of European nations
contributed information to the system before the 2019 European Parliament
elections). Further, and ahead of the European Parliament elections, in April
2019 ENISA hosted a “war game” that was focused on identifying governance
gaps and deepening ties to aid in regional election security efforts. Such efforts
can help train election officials across the EU, though much more remains to
be done help get local staffers up to speed, which is a similar issue facing many
campaigns and election boards in the United States. That is why the Harvard
Kennedy School’s Belfer Center on Science and International Affairs, for
example, has focused on training these officials on the basics of cyber hygiene
and election security best practices. For further discussion of the Belfer
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At its most basic, the Report fails to “cover the issue of
domestic or non-state actors in any substantive way or provide
any real solutions.”233 Yet it is overly simplistic to believe all
misinformation is produced from foreign actors, as was
discussed in Part II. The Report’s failure to appreciate the
nature and varied sources of potential actors is a significant
limitation.234 Moreover, there has been little to suggest that the
reporting to date has been as robust or useful as originally
hoped.235 Nonetheless, the report and various initiatives are
noteworthy first steps to improve the EU’s election
cybersecurity, steps that other nations are watching closely.
B.

Illustrative Examples: Australia, Oceania, and Asia

This section builds from the comparative transatlantic case
study outlined above with illustrative examples from how other
advanced and emerging democracies are both protecting their
election infrastructure and working to fend off digital
repression. We begin by examining Australia, before moving on
to several examples from Oceania and Asia before summarizing
our key findings and moving on to policy implications.

Center’s work in this area, see BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFS., HARVARD
KENNEDY SCH., THE STATE AND LOCAL ELECTION CYBERSECURITY PLAYBOOK
(2018), https://perma.cc/7SK2-SYLP (PDF).
233. Jakub Kalenský, Evaluation of the EU Elections: Many Gaps Still
Remain, DISINFO PORTAL (June 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/3TGJ-2LFC (last
updated Sept. 3, 2019).
234. See id. (“If we do not know how many channels hostile actors control,
how many messages they spread, and how many people they manage to
persuade, how can we talk about proportional defense?”).
235. See id. (stating that in private conversations EU Member State
representatives report that “many countries apparently still lack their own
monitoring systems for the disinformation ecosystem, and . . . the RAS is
barely used”); James Pamment, The EU’s Role in Fighting Disinformation:
Taking Back the Initiative, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (July 15,
2020), https://perma.cc/EFF6-UXM8 (arguing that the EU’s current
disinformation policy is “characterized by . . . a weak evidence base” and that
“a lack of trust between member states has led to low levels of information
sharing and engagement”).
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Australia

Australia, like EU Member States, the U.S., and other
democracies throughout Oceania, is no stranger to
disinformation campaigns and other attempts to subvert its
democratic institutions.236 The threats to Australian democracy
do differ in several notable ways, though, from the nation’s other
Western peers.237 For example, voting is mandatory in
Australia,238 and the major parties in Australia must agree on
boundary lines.239 This thereby reduces some of the common
issues that can arise in the context of broader U.S. democracy
preservation conversations.240 The process of voting is also
distinct from its American and even some European
counterparts.241 For example, all Australians vote on paper,
their votes are tallied by hand, and a robust Electoral
Commission oversees the process to check for irregularities.242
236. See Stephanie Borys, China’s ‘Brazen’ and ‘Aggressive’ Political
Interference Outlined in Top-Secret Report, ABC NEWS (May 29, 2018),
https://perma.cc/7URJ-E6MU (last updated May 29, 2018) (describing the
release of an intelligence report from the Australian government concluding
that the Chinese government had attempted to infiltrate all levels of the
Australian government for years).
237. See Scott J. Shackelford & Matthew Sussex, How Australia Can Help
the US Make Democracy Harder to Hack, CONVERSATION (Sept. 27, 2018, 6:35
AM), https://perma.cc/E289-3B5X (observing that threats to Australia’s voting
system may largely relate to the government’s centralization of the system,
while threats to voting in the U.S. are tied to the privatization and
decentralization of voting).
238. See id. (discussing Australia’s voting system).
239. See id. (stating that the major parties agree on electoral boundaries
to prevent gerrymandering); Rodney Smith, Chapter 8: Drawing Electoral
Boundaries, ST. LIBR. N.S.W., https://perma.cc/S65W-WLCR (last updated
Apr. 2019) (explaining how Australia draws its electoral boundaries).
240. See Shackelford & Sussex, supra note 237 (arguing that Australia’s
mandatory voting law means that “there aren’t thorny political battles over
who is allowed to vote,” and that party agreement on electoral boundaries
prevents gerrymandering); Smith, supra note 239 (observing that the
involvement of state legislatures in drawing electoral boundaries in the U.S.
“means that American redistribution processes are much more involved with
party politics than they are in Australia”).
241. See Shackelford & Sussex, supra note 237.
242. See id.; Counting the Votes, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMM’N,
https://perma.cc/8HBG-AMNB (last updated Dec. 3, 2019) (outlining the
Australian ballot tabulation process).
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Australia has also taken the affirmative step of designating its
political parties as critical infrastructure, similar to the U.K.’s
approach,243 along with investing in efforts to guard Australians
against information warfare using micro-targeting.244 The U.S.,
on the other hand, continues to rely on outdated technologies
and systems despite years of warnings, as was discussed in Part
III. Yet even these safeguards cannot inoculate Australia, the
U.S., or any nation against the full range of attacks designed to
influence public opinion, interfere with politicians, and the
media.245 For example, in February 2019, despite these efforts,
the Australian Parliament was breached by a state-sponsored
cyber-attack allegedly from China.246
Australia has no rapid-alert system or code of conduct of the
kind being tried in the EU to better manage the spread of
disinformation.247 It did, however, sign both the Paris and
Christchurch Calls, which are discussed further below, further

243. See Press Release, Scott Morrison, Prime Minister of Austl.,
Statement to the House of Representatives on Cyber Security (Feb. 18, 2019),
https://perma.cc/5LE8-CPAB (declaring that “Australia’s democratic process
is . . . our most critical piece of national infrastructure” and announcing that
the Australian Cyber Security Centre was ready to provide immediate support
to any political party).
244. See Shackelford & Sussex, supra note 237 (“Australia has decided to
invest early to guard against future information warfare, such as
micro-targeting audiences with tailor-made messaging and machine
learning-enhanced deepfake videos.”).
245. See, e.g., Aaron Patrick, Sam Dastyari is a Chinese ‘Agent of
Influence’: Ex-Intelligence Chief, FIN. REV. (Dec. 3, 2017, 11:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/ETE6-5WCV (last updated Dec. 4, 2017) (“A top former
intelligence official believes there is evidence that Labor senator Sam Dastyari
was deliberately targeted by the China government to advance its interests in
Australia.”).
246. See China Rejects Australian Parliament Cyber Attack Claims as
‘Baseless’ and ‘Irresponsible,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 18, 2019, 3:39 PM),
https://perma.cc/ML5T-PC95 (reporting that Australian cyber experts were
investigating a sophisticated cyber-attack on the “Liberal, Labor and National
party platforms . . . [that occurred] during a breach of the Australian
Parliament House network”).
247. See Daniel Funke & Daniela Flamini, A Guide to Anti-Misinformation
Actions Around the World, POYNTER INST., https://perma.cc/2MPG-DWP9 (last
updated Aug. 13, 2020) (describing the Australian government’s work to stop
misinformation, including the establishment of a government task force and
implementation of a media literacy campaign).
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isolating the United States as the only member of the Five Eyes
intelligence sharing partners to stay out of these agreements.248
2.

Oceania

Examining the regional context surrounding Australia is a
useful exercise to better understand the unique approaches
being taken by developing nations in response to the cyber
threats they face.249 Given the lack of attention in the area
relative to other more often studied cyber powers, such a study
is vital to help build resilience, and trust, in democratic systems
of strategic significance in the South Pacific.250
As for election infrastructure, Pacific island nations’
election infrastructure and security efforts across Oceania range
from quite sophisticated to relatively immature. New Zealand,
for example, has a fairly robust, formal election
infrastructure,251 while in others—such as the Federated State
248. See World Leaders and Tech Giants Sign Ardern’s ‘Christchurch Call’
to Curb Online Extremism, SBS NEWS (May 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/G433QEUS (describing the Christchurch Call’s goal of engaging major tech
companies in the effort to “stamp[] out violent extremist content on the
internet” and highlighting that the U.S. was not among the eighteen
government signatories); The Supporters, PARIS CALL, https://perma.cc/R6NJHYCU (listing signatories to the Paris Call for Trust and Security in
Cyberspace); Our Values: Collaboration, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL.,
https://perma.cc/JF8T-ET53 (explaining that the “Five Eyes” group is a
“long-lasting intelligence collaboration” between the U.S., United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand that developed after World War II).
249. See, e.g., David Shullman, Protect the Party: China’s Growing
Influence in the Developing World, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 22, 2019),
https://perma.cc/W7KN-QDYU (noting that China continues to grow its
influence among Indo-Pacific countries, partly by manipulating the
information space in the region).
250. This case study stems from the work of talented graduate students
who worked together under the supervision of Professor Shackelford on a
capstone team investigating election security in Spring 2019. These students
include: Coryn Blacketer, Will Bobe, Bill Boger, Colin Darnell, Caellaigh
Klemz, Janaki Reddy Gaddam, Kayla Hill, Tony Kelly, Jonathan Schubauer,
and Aaron West. Jonathan Schubauer took the lead in summarizing their
work for this Article.
251. See ONLINE VOTING WORKING PARTY, ONLINE VOTING IN NEW ZEALAND:
FEASIBILITY AND OPTIONS FOR LOCAL ELECTIONS 12–16 (2014),
https://perma.cc/925F-Z5F7 (PDF) (providing an overview of New Zealand’s
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of Micronesia, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu—there is little
election infrastructure to monitor.252 Yet many of the nations
comprising Oceania do rely on paper ballot voting systems
similar to the EU, are geographically isolated, and with the
exception of New Zealand, have relatively small populations
with
historical
connections
to
well-established
democracies—namely the British Commonwealth, and the
United States.253
The Russian hacking efforts during the 2016 U.S.
presidential campaign were direct and intensive.254 In contrast,
Chinese efforts in Australia and throughout Oceania have been
more indirect.255 Although China denies this, it is asserting
itself militarily and economically throughout Oceania in an
attempt to challenge the global reach and power of the United
States, particularly in the Pacific.256 In fact, there is little
evidence of extensive hacking, instead China has sought to
influence policy through economic assistance and political
contributions to candidates and parties,257 a strategy which
these nations have yet to effectively defend against in an
voting systems and infrastructure); see also Dylan Matthews, 3 Reasons Why
New Zealand Has the Best-Designed Government in the World, VOX,
https://perma.cc/6J5W-GC5E (last updated Jan. 16, 2015) (explaining New
Zealand’s mixed-member proportional representation electoral system and
unicameral legislative structure).
252. See IND. UNIV. & AUSTL. NAT’L UNIV., MAKING DEMOCRACY HARDER TO
HACK 76 (2019), https://perma.cc/E3WH-MMYM (PDF) (summarizing findings
from case studies of election security efforts and election infrastructure in
Pacific Island nations).
253. See Stewart Firth, Instability in the Pacific: A Status Report, LOWY
INST. (June 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/E2TH-MH5S (outlining trends in
demographics, urbanization, and democracy in the Pacific Islands).
254. See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Shullman, supra note 249 (discussing China’s efforts to
increase its global influence by funding infrastructure projects and
“manipulating the information space to [its] advantage” in low-income
countries).
256. See NADÈGE ROLLAND, CHINA’S EURASIAN CENTURY? 93–120 (2017)
(theorizing that China is using its Belt and Road Initiative to “increase its own
regional influence” and thereby prevent the United States from increasing
American influence in the region).
257. See Shullman, supra note 249 (arguing that China’s approach to
developing nations is largely driven by a need to protect the integrity and
reputation of the Chinese Communist Party).
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integrated manner similar to the EU Code for Disinformation
discussed above.258
Despite the lack of a regional strategy, there are already
several efforts underway in the South Pacific to buttress
cyber-threat information sharing. For example, as part of
Australia’s “International Cyber Engagement Strategy,” the
Pacific Cyber Security Operational Network (PaCSON) was
established in April 2018.259 PaCSON is intended to foster
cooperation among South Pacific island nations by providing a
mechanism to share cybersecurity threat information and
defensive tools, techniques and ideas. 260 At its core, PaCSON
consists of a network of government-appointed cybersecurity
incident response experts from Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji,
Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Niue, Palau,
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tokelau,
Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.261 However, there is no existing or
planned formal or informal regional structure in the South
Pacific dealing with the security of election infrastructure.262
3.

Asia

As with Oceania, democracies across Asia are also dealing
with election insecurity and disinformation.263 While this
Article does not seek to fully address the myriad of threats to
election infrastructure across Asia, it is worth briefly noting
three trends in managing the twin threats of election integrity
258. See supra notes 207–208 and accompanying text.
259. Pacific Cyber Security Operational Network (PaCSON), AUSTL. GOV’T
DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFS. & TRADE, https://perma.cc/RNC2-PNDS.
260. See id. (“PaCSON enables cooperation and collaboration by
empowering members to share cyber security threat information, tools,
techniques and ideas between nations.”).
261. See id. (listing its members).
262. See IND. UNIV. & AUSTL. NAT’L UNIV., supra note 252, at 101
(explaining existing regional efforts dealing with cyber security and
recommending the adoption of a “cohesive Pacific regional cybersecurity
group”).
263. See, e.g., Allie Funk, Asia’s Elections Are Plagued by Online
Disinformation, FREEDOM HOUSE (May 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/GYD3-GHGZ
(“Parties and candidates across the region have turned to content
manipulation as a preferred campaign tactic.”).
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and disinformation. First, unlike efforts in the U.S., EU, or
Australia, Asian democracies have been willing to criminalize
the spreading of misinformation. Malaysia, for example, has
criminalized the sharing of misinformation.264 Myanmar and
Thailand have leaned on law enforcement actions to reign in
misinformation, which have been abused in some cases to
silence critics of public corruption.265
Second, there has been focused attention on this issue from
the highest levels of national leadership. In Indonesia, for
example, President Joko Widodo spearheaded the creation of
the new National Cyber and Encryption Agency to combat
disinformation in their elections.266 One example was in June
2019, when a member of the Muslim Cyber Army was arrested
in Java for posting misinformation to the effect that the
Indonesian government was being controlled by China.267
Third, it is apparent that more nations are using
increasingly heavy-handed tactics to clamp down on internet
freedoms in the name of fighting disinformation. The problem of
disinformation in India, for example, is so severe that it has
been likened to a public health crisis.268 One Microsoft study, for

264. See Funke & Flamini, supra note 28 (“The law makes publishing or
sharing fake news punishable by up to six years in jail and a fine of 500,000
ringgit ($128,000). It also makes online service providers more responsible for
third-party content [and] affects foreign news outlets reporting on
Malaysia . . . .”).
265. See id. (reporting that in 2018 Myanmar authorities jailed three
journalists for publishing a story about the regional government and that since
2018 Thai officials have increasingly targeted people who allegedly spread
false information on social media); Tactics to Fight Disinformation in
Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines and India, GLOB. GROUND MEDIA
(Apr. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/BG89-JPZ8 (noting fears that Thailand’s
military junta would use combating misinformation on social media as a
screen for increased censorship of political dissent).
266. See Funke & Flamini, supra note 28 (reporting that “the agency was
hiring hundreds of people to ‘provide protection’ to institutions online,”
although the specific parameters of its authority were “still unclear”).
267. See id. (noting that man was “charged with spreading fake news and
hate speech”).
268. See Samir Patil, India Has a Public Health Crisis. It’s Called Fake
News., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/CV4B-64FZ (arguing that
India should implement citizen education campaigns modeled on successful
public health campaigns in order to combat widespread disinformation).

Stemler.PostBlueline.docx (Do Not Delete)

1/15/2021 5:03 PM

1799

DEFENDING DEMOCRACY

example, found that 64 percent of Indians encountered
disinformation online in 2019, which was the highest proportion
among twenty-two surveyed countries.269 Not only have these
incidents affected elections such as by spreading false
information about candidates on WhatsApp, 270 but they have led
to real-world harms including at least thirty-three deaths and
sixty-nine instances of mob violence.271 In response, the Indian
government has shut down the internet more than one hundred
times over the past year,272 and has proposed laws that would
give it largely unchecked surveillance powers, mirroring
Chinese-style internet censorship.273
C.

Summary

As is apparent from these case studies and illustrative
examples, there is divergent state practice with regards to both
the protection of election infrastructure and the use of digital
repression. The area of greatest convergence seems to be the
recognition that paper ballots, or at the least EVMs using paper
trails, are vital to building confidence in the outcome of an
election.274 Fewer jurisdictions that we could identify have

269. Microsoft Releases Digital Civility Index on Safer Internet Day,
MICROSOFT (Feb. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/QRD8-UJTS.
270. See Patil, supra note 268 (reporting that police linked a fake video
that was shared on WhatsApp to the deaths of 62 people in sectarian violence
and the displacement of 50,000 more six months before India’s general
elections in 2014).
271. See Child-Lifting Rumours Caused 69 Mob Attacks, 33 Deaths in Last
18 Months, BUS. STANDARD, https://perma.cc/89LK-TZ7P (last updated July 9,
2018) (reporting that between January 2017 and July 2018 rumors of
“child-lifting” spread on Indian social media led to dozens of mob attacks on
suspected abductors and thirty-three deaths).
272. See Funke & Flamini, supra note 28.
273. See Vindu Goel, India Proposes Chinese-Style Internet Censorship,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/L48R-MPA8 (explaining that the
proposed rules would allow officials to demand that social media sites remove
particular categories of content, build automated screening tools to block
“unlawful information,” and provide authorities with greater access to
individual user accounts on messaging platforms).
274. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 150 (“The key insight behind auditing
as a cyber defense is that if you have a paper record that the voter got to
inspect, then that can’t later be changed by a cyber-attack.”).
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taken the next step of requiring risk-limiting audits or have
reclassified their election infrastructure or political parties as
“critical.”275 These findings are summarized in Table 2 and are
unpacked further in Part V.
Table 2: Summary of Surveyed Nation-State Efforts to
Protect Election Integrity
United
States

European Australia
Union

Asian
Democracies

Oceania

Paper
Ballots

Fourteen
U.S. states
use voting
machines
without a
paper trail
as of 2019

Major EU
Member
States
including
Germany
and the
Netherlands use
paper
ballots

India
(EVMs
with
paper
trail),
Japan

New
Zealand,
Micronesia,
Fiji,
Kiribati,
Palau,
Marshall
Islands,
Papa
New
Guinea,
Samoa,
Solomon
Islands,
Tonga,
Tuvalu

RiskLimiting
Audits

Four U.S.
states
(Colorado,
Rhode
Island,
Nevada,
and

Suggested, No
but not
required
under
2018 EU
Compendium

Unclear

No

275.

See infra Table 2.

Paper
ballots in
national
elections
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Virginia)
276

International
Cooperation

Intelligence
sharing
through
Five Eyes

Required
under NIS
Directive
for EU
Member
States

Intelligence
sharing
through
Five Eyes

ASEAN

Digital
Repression

No
integrated
strategy

EU Code
of Practice
on Disinformation;
EU Rapid
Alert
System

Electoral
Integrity
Assurance
Task Force

Thailand No inteand
grated
Myanmar strategy
criminalize the
sharing of
misinformation

Election
Infrastructure
Classified
as
“Critical”

Yes

Estonia

No

Unclear

No

Political
Parties
Classified
as
“Critical”

No

United
Kingdom

Yes

Unclear

No

V.

PaCSON

Implications for Policymakers

Cyberspace has long bedeviled policymakers, practitioners,
and even novelists alike. As the science fiction author William
Gibson admitted when he used the word ‘cyberspace’ in his book
Neuromancer: “All I knew about the word ‘cyberspace’ when I

276. See Post-Election Audits, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, (Oct. 25,
2019), https://perma.cc/N38D-C63L (listing the only four states with a
statutory requirement for risk-limiting audits).
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coined it, was that it seemed like an effective buzzword. It
seemed evocative and essentially meaningless. It was
suggestive of something, but had no real semantic meaning,
even for me, as I saw it emerge on the page.”277 As with
cyberspace generally, and has been shown through this Article
the number of threats facing democratic institutions—including
with regards to election security and digital repression—is long,
and seemingly only growing longer.278 Indeed, the likes of Henry
Farrell and Bruce Schneier have argued that: “the open forms
of input and exchange that it [democracy] relies on can be
weaponized to inject falsehood and misinformation that erode
democratic debate.”279 Opinions vary as to whether to consider
democracy itself as a cyber threat vector, and how to mitigate
the risks, such as by doubling down on democratic institutions
or relying on other actors—including the private sector—to
better manage these issues such as the spread of disinformation
through the EU-organized Code discussed in Part IV. This Part
proceeds by summarizing the policy suggestions made
throughout using an analytical framework pioneered by Peter
Swire, among others.280
In 1948, George Kennan, an American diplomat and a
historian, defined national security as “the continued ability of
the country to pursue the development of its internal life
without serious interference, or threat of interference, from
foreign powers.”281 Yet such a conception of national security is
not so clear cut when the goal is protecting democracy itself, as
seen in cases of Russian operatives organizing U.S. citizens to

277. JARICE HANSON, THE SOCIAL MEDIA REVOLUTION 113 (2016).
278. See supra Part II.
279. Henry Farrell & Bruce Schneier, Democracy’s Dilemma, BOS. REV.
(May 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/RF2K-XHLU.
280. See Peter Swire, A Pedagogic Cybersecurity Framework, 61 COMMC’NS
ACM 23, 23–24 (2018) (proposing a multidisciplinary framework for teaching
cybersecurity that “organizes the subjects that have not been included in
traditional cybersecurity courses, but instead address cybersecurity
management, policy, law, and international affairs”).
281. Gayle Smith, In Search of Sustainable Security, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (June 19, 2008, 9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/7XEY-U2KW.
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engage in activism during the 2016 election cycle. 282 Neither is
an analytical framework to ascertain all the necessary steps
that must be taken to harden democratic institutions against
these attacks. What follows is a suggested path forward. Before
turning to the work of Swire, though, it is first necessary to
provide some context.
Numerous regulatory theorists and governance scholars
have considered cyberspace, including the best ways to
engender change in this dynamic, interconnected environment.
Yochai Benkler, for example, has offered a three-layer structure
to consider interventions, including: (1) the “physical
infrastructure,” including the fiber-optic cables and routers
making up the physical aspect of cyberspace; (2) the “logical
infrastructure,” comprising necessary “software such as the
TCP/IP protocol;” and (3) the “content layer,” which includes
data and, indirectly, users.283 This conceptualization, while
helpful, only takes us so far in better understanding the various
cyber threats facing democratic institutions and what to do
about them. It largely ignores, for example, the role played by
state and non-state actors in shaping the content layer.284
Lawrence Lessig built from this model,285 advocating for
“decentralized innovation” making use of various modalities
including interventions supporting layers.286 However, Andrew
282. See, e.g., Shaun Walker, Russian Troll Factory Paid US Activists to
Help Fund Protests During Election, GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2017, 12:13 PM),
https://perma.cc/C8D4-N3EJ (reporting that Russian “trolls” offered $80,000
to U.S. activists in order to support the organization of protests and events
about divisive social issues).
283. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper
Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52
FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 561, 562 (2000).
284. See, e.g., Swire, supra note 280, at 24 (explaining that private
organizations and national governments influence cybersecurity risks and
responses by taking action to mitigate attacks, enacting and enforce laws, and
engaging in dialogue or signing treaties with other nations).
285. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
160 (2004) (describing “the interaction between architecture and law” in the
context of copyright regulation).
286. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 85–86 (2001) (arguing that “commons” at
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Murray has concluded that this is “idealistic” and that, “the
harnessing of one regulatory modality through the application
of another is more likely to lead to further regulatory
competition, due to the complexity of the network
environment.”287 Instead of solely relying on code, then, laws,
norms, and markets also have important roles to play in shaping
a polycentric response to addressing vulnerabilities in
democratic election systems.288
One way to think through such a polycentric approach is to
make use of Swire’s stack analogy,289 offered in adapted form as
Table 3. Under this formulation, the foregoing analysis was
concerned with levels seven through ten, but the chart
highlights the extent to which it is vital to secure the underlying
system architecture including voting machines.
Table 3: Applying Swire’s Expanded OSI Stack to
Election Security290
Layer
1. Physical

Vulnerability

Policy
Response(s)

Supply chain attack; Employ third-party
wiretap; stress
penetration testing
equipment
and audits; require

the code, content, and physical layers “create the opportunity for individuals
to draw upon resources without connections, permission, or access granted by
others”).
287. ANDREW D. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN
THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 46 (2007) (“It is highly unlikely that content
producers, media corporations and other copyright holders will allow for a
neutral system designed to protect cultural property and creativity at the cost
of loss of control over their products.”).
288. See id. at 46–47, 124 (“[T]he effectiveness of code-based control
mechanisms depends entirely upon their recognition and acceptance within
these first-order regulatory environments [competition, society, and
hierarchy].”).
289. See Swire, supra note 280, at 24 (explaining that Swire’s model adds
three “layers” of cybersecurity vulnerabilities to the seven traditional layers
of the Open Systems Interconnection model that computer scientists use to
conceptualize computer systems).
290. Id. For a description of these cyber-attacks, see Chapter 3 in SCOTT J.
SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS,
AND RELATIONS (2014).
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NIST CSF
compliance;
consider smart
contracts
2. Data Link

Cause delays or
noise

End-to-end
encryption

3. Network

Domain Name
System (DNS) and
Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP)
attacks

Utilize BGP
security features as
well as DNSSEC

4. Transport

Man-in-the-middle
attacks

Defense in depth &
security by design
techniques

5. Session

Session splicing

Enhanced cyber
hygiene

6. Presentation

Attacks on
encryption

Stronger encryption
(even quantum)

7. Application

Malware

Proactive
cybersecurity
measures; cyber
hygiene

8. Organization

Insider attacks; lack
of adequate
information sharing
(between election
officials or with
allies)

More robust
information
sharing; require
state-of-the-art
technical standards
and paper ballots
along with risklimiting audits

9. Government

Weak laws for
protecting critical
infrastructure, IoT,
voting machines,
and media outlets

Reform efforts such
as the Secure
Elections Act; push
firms to adopt
Disinformation
Codes of Conduct;
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train election
officials

10. International

Nation-state
cyber-attacks; lack
of international
agreements to limit
the use of
cyber-attacks on
election
infrastructure;
inadequate dispute
resolution

Agree on new
election security
international norms
(such as through
Paris Call or UN
GGE process);
ratify a treaty
designed to
safeguard civilian
critical
infrastructure;
create new cyber
threat information
sharing forums and
joint sanctions
regimes for rule
breakers

As Table 3 shows, there is a great deal that both the public
and private sectors can do, locally and globally, to make
democracy harder to hack. Particularly on levels eight through
ten of Swire’s Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) stack
analogy, which is popular among programmers in illustrating
the various levels of systems, there is a great deal more that the
U.S. and other democracies can and should be doing to secure
vulnerable election infrastructure and combat digital
repression.
In the United States, despite post-2016 funding, still more
than two-thirds of U.S. counties report insufficient funding to
replace outdated, vulnerable paperless voting machines, further
help is needed.291 Aside from appropriating sufficient funds to
replace outdated voting machines and tabulation systems,
Congress also should encourage states to follow Colorado’s
291. See Lawrence Norden & Andrea Córdova McCadney, Voting
Machines at Risk: Where We Stand Today, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 5,
2019), https://perma.cc/99U9-PVKD.
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example292 (and the best practices listed in the EU
Compendium)293 by refusing to fund voting machines that use
paperless ballots, and requiring risk-limiting audits, which use
statistical samples of paper ballots to check if official election
results are correct, to increase confidence in election outcomes.
Congress should also require NIST to update their voting
machine standards, which state and county election officials
rely on in deciding which machines to purchase as in the case of
Australia.294 Further, a National Cybersecurity Safety Board
could also be created to investigate cyber-attacks on U.S.
election infrastructure and issue reports after elections to help
ensure that vulnerabilities do not go unaddressed. 295 A crash
course is also needed for local and county election officials across
the nation.296 There is an opportunity for both civil society and
higher education to aid in this effort, as Indiana University is
doing to help the Secretary of State’s Office prepare for a wide
array of scenarios, conduct tabletop exercises, and create a
cybersecurity guidebook for use by newly elected and appointed
292. See Nathaniel Minor, Colorado Is a Pretty Darn Safe Place to Cast a
Ballot. This Is How We Got Here, COLO. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://perma.cc/4X9P-4HDC (describing Colorado’s ballot-counting and
risk-limiting audit systems and observing that the Washington Post called
Colorado “the ‘safest’ place to cast a ballot” in the United States).
293. See generally COMPENDIUM, supra note 33 (listing the cyber security
best practices).
294. See Eric Geller, New Federal Guidelines Could Ban Internet in Voting
Machines, POLITICO (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:03 PM), https://perma.cc/U4K6-469Z
(“[The Voluntary Voting System Guidelines]—produced by the Election
Assistance Commission and the technical standards agency NIST—is not a set
of mandatory federal rules. However, most states require voting equipment to
pass VVSG-based testing before they buy it.”).
295. See Scott J. Shackelford & Austin E. Brady, Is It Time for a National
Cybersecurity Safety Board? Examining the Policy Implications and Political
Pushback, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 56, 68 (2018) (“Such a model would be an
improvement on the existing reliance on Cyber Emergency Response
Teams . . . and aide in effective policymaking at both the state and federal
level given the lack of hard, verifiable data on the scope and scale of
cyber-attacks.”).
296. See, e.g., Indiana University to Help Secure Indiana’s 2020 Elections,
IND. UNIV. (Oct. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/SV86-G6VP (noting that Indiana
University will host “regional ‘boot camps’ with [Indiana] county clerk offices
to train election officials about how to respond to different forms of
cyberattacks, such as phishing, phone scams and impersonation calls”).
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election officials.297 Other states could engage in similar
partnerships, along with pooling resources to create repositories
of best practices.
Learning lessons from the case studies in Part IV, the U.S.
government could build out the capability of DHS to ward off
disinformation campaigns similar to Indonesia’s approach, as
California is doing through its Secretary of State’s Office.298
Ahead of the 2020 election cycle, the United States could also
work with allies around the world to build from the Paris Call
for Trust and Security in Cyberspace and the Christchurch Call
with these specific actions, perhaps encapsulated in a Call to
Safeguard Democracy.299 The UN Group of Government Experts
and standing working group should be leveraged in this effort,
and new regional cybersecurity hubs created to speed the
transfer of information between jurisdictions as has already
been accomplished through the EU’s Cooperation Groups.300
One possibility is a regional approach, such as a “South Pacific
Elections—Information and Analysis Center (SPE-ISAC),” a
potential solution to the lack of a cohesive Pacific regional
cybersecurity group.301
Finally, with regards to disinformation in particular, the
U.S. government could work with the EU to globalize the
self-regulatory Code of Practice on Disinformation for social
297. See id. (“[S]tate legislators have awarded Indiana University
$301,958 to partner with the Indiana Secretary of State’s Office to review and
improve the state’s election cybersecurity incident response plan.”).
298. See Ben Adler, California Launches New Effort to Fight Election
Disinformation, CAPRADIO (Sept. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/6YSA-FY2L
(“Under a recently-passed law, the office will ‘monitor and counteract false or
misleading information’ that could ‘suppress voter participation or cause
confusion and disruption of the orderly and secure administration of
elections.’” (internal citations omitted)).
299. See World Leaders and Tech Giants Sign Ardern’s ‘Christchurch Call’
to Curb Online Extremism, SBS NEWS (May 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/G433QEUS (explaining that the Christchurch Call is a pledge to eradicate “violent
extremist content on the internet” signed by national governments and major
technology companies).
300. See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text.
301. See IND. UNIV. & AUSTL. NAT’L UNIV., supra note 252, at 101–05
(proposing specific features of a potential SPE-ISAC, considering potential
benefits of such an approach, and recommending next steps for its
implementation).
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media firms (thus avoiding thorny First Amendment
concerns).302 It could also work to create new forums for
international information sharing and more effective rapid alert
and joint sanctions regimes.303 The international community
has the tools to act and hold accountable those actors that would
threaten democratic institutions. Failing the political will to act,
pressure from consumer groups and civil society will continue to
mount on tech firms, in particular Facebook, which may be
sufficient for them to voluntarily expand their efforts in the EU
globally, the same way that more firms are beginning to comply
with GDPR globally as opposed to designing new information
systems for each jurisdiction.304
VI.

Conclusion

No nation, however powerful, or tech firm, regardless of its
ambitions, is able to safeguard democracies against the full
range of threats they face in 2020 and beyond. Only a
multifaceted, polycentric approach that makes necessary
changes up and down the stack will be up to the task. By
working together, we might even be able to prove John Adams
wrong by showing that—despite the challenges—democratic
sustainability is indeed possible even in a hyper-connected
future.305

302.
303.
304.

See supra notes 207–211 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 226–232 and accompanying text.
DIGITALEUROPE, ALMOST TWO YEARS OF GDPR: CELEBRATING AND
IMPROVING THE APPLICATION OF EUROPE’S DATA PROTECTION FRAMEWORK 3
(2020), https://perma.cc/72PY-TM5X (PDF) (“[T]he fact that the GDPR has
inspired other data protection regimes around the world, at least regarding its
principles, has led many organisations to address data protection not only for
their EU operations but also globally . . . .”).
305. See Letter from John Adams to John Taylor, supra note 1 (“Remember
Democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes[,] exhausts and murders itself.
There never was a Democracy Yet, that did not commit suicide.”).

